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This thesis studies the evolution of the Indonesian government’s response to the 
threat of transnational jihadism and addresses the debate over the effectiveness of its 
counterterrorism policy. It poses the question: has Indonesian policy on transnational 
terrorism been effective in combating the mobilization of radical Islamic groups? By 
examining the three periods since Indonesia’s transition to democracy—1998-2001, 
2002-2008, and 2009-present—the prominent political and social issues considered by 
politicians and counterterrorist specialists can be seen through the lenses of the threats 
facing Indonesia and the state’s response. Through these means, the evolution and 
effectiveness of Indonesian counterterrorism may be further measured against the context 
and interplay of three factors: counterterrorism policies chosen, changing nature and 
evolution of the jihadist groups, and public opinion. These factors enabled state capacity 
and the implementation of a criminal justice counterterrorism approach effectively 
implementing "hard" and "soft" methods. With continued implementation of this 
approach, Indonesia may be positioned to combat the re-emergent transnationally 
influenced jihadist threats. The findings and lessons learned identified in this thesis may 
assist countries like Indonesia in their CT strategy development, capacity building, and 
application.  
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A. MAJOR RESEARCH QUESTION 
The phenomenon of transnational Islamic jihadism, born in the modern era, 
nested with domestic radical Islamic aims in Southeast Asia and came to play a critical 
part in influencing Indonesia’s radical based Islamic groups since its democratization.1 
This thesis studies the evolution of the Indonesian governments’ response to this 
increasing threat to its national security. This thesis asks the question: has Indonesian 
policy on transnational terrorism been effective in combating the mobilization of radical 
Islamic groups? 
B. SIGNIFICANCE OF THE RESEARCH QUESTION AND BACKGROUND 
Recently, the threat posed by transnational Islamic jihadism has been rejuvenated 
on the world stage and within Southeast Asia through a new organization springing from 
the ashes of al-Qaeda In Iraq (AQI): the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS).2 By June 
29, 2014, ISIS would declare itself to be the Islamic State (IS)—the new Caliphate under 
Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi as appointed Caliph Ibrahim.3 IS’s successes on the ground and 
unprecedented use of social networking and media resources have enabled the group to 
further its reach in spreading its perverse, jihadist-oriented interpretation of Salafist 
ideology and beliefs throughout the world.4 Southeast Asian nations and Indonesia in 
particular have not been spared IS’s propaganda and influences on its citizens. 
In the context of an inquiry into the effectiveness of Indonesia’s counterterrorism 
(CT) efforts and policies on transnational terrorism, the re-emergence of transnational 
jihadist threats begs the initial questions: To what extent have Indonesian radical 
                                                 
1 Greg Barton, Indonesia’s Struggle: Jemaah Islamiyah and the Soul of Islam (Sydney, Australia: 
Univ. of New South Wales Press, 2004), 45. 
2 Hassan Hassan and Michael Weiss, ISIS: Inside the Army of Terror (New York: Regan Arts, 2015), 
1. 
3 Philip Ross, “ISIL, ISIS, Islamic State, Daesh: What’s the Difference?” International Business 
Times, June 9, 2015, http://www.ibtimes.com/isil-isis-islamic-state-daesh-whats-difference-1693495; 
Hassan and Weiss, ISIS: Inside the Army, 1. 
4 Hassan and Weiss, ISIS: Inside the Army, 170. 
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Islamists been mobilized, and what threats do they and their supporters present to 
Indonesia? With the onset of civil war in Syria, Indonesian foreign fighters have flocked 
to the banners of both IS and al-Nusra Front (ANF), the Support Front for the People of 
Greater Syria, the al-Qaeda (AQ) affiliated rebel group.5 
Since IS’s declaration as a modern self-designated Caliphate, Indonesians varying 
from foreign fighters traveling to the region (reported numbers ranging from 500 to as 
high as 800), numerous domestic organizations (al-Mustaqbal and Mujahidin Indonesia 
Timur [MIT]), and the conduct of “pledging ceremonies” by individuals in and out of the 
prison systems (over 2,000 alone from July to August 2014) have declared their support 
and or allegiance, bai’at, to IS.6 Finally, those foreign fighters from Southeast Asia 
fighting with IS have been organized into a cohesive fighting unit, the Katibah Nusantara 
(KN), later named Majmu’ah Persiapan Al Arkhabily (MPA), the Archipelago Group-in-
Preparation, composed solely of foreign fighters of Indonesian and Malaysian origin.7 
Like the Afghan veterans before them, many of these contemporary jihadist foreign 
fighters possess the ultimate ambitions to someday return home and establish a pan-
regional Islamic State of their own, the Daulah Islamiyah Nusantara.8 
Despite the distances involved and seemingly small percentage that the 
Indonesian foreign fighters comprise within the ranks of both IS and ANF—with IS 
                                                 
5 Institute for Policy Analysis of Conflict (IPAC), Indonesians and the Syrian Conflict (IPAC Report 
No. 6) (Jakarta: IPAC, 2014), 8–9; Greg Fealy and John Funston, Indonesian and Malaysian Support for 
the Islamic State (Arlington, VA: Management Systems International, 2016), 7. 
6 “Militants Planned ISIS Regime in Malaysia,” Straits Times, April 8, 2015, ProQuest (1671000037); 
Elliot Brennan, “How Southeast Asia is Responding to ISIS,” Interpreter, March 5, 2015, 
http://www.lowyinterpreter.org/post/2015/03/05/How-should-we-respond-to-ISIS-in-Southeast-Asia.aspx; 
Institute for Policy Analysis of Conflict, The Evolution of ISIS in Indonesia (IPAC Report No. 13) (Jakarta: 
IPAC, 2014), 1; Zachary Abuza, “Joining the Caravan: ISIS and the Regeneration of Terrorism in 
Southeast Asia,” Strategic Studies Institute, June 25, 2015, http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/ 
index.cfm/articles/joining-the-new-caravan/2015/06/25; Sidney Jones and Solahudin, “ISIS in Indonesia,” 
Southeast Asian Affairs (2015): 158, http://muse.jhu.edu/journals/saa/summary/v2015/2015.jones.html; 
Edward Delman, “ISIS in the World’s Largest Muslim Country: Why Are So Few Indonesians Joining the 
Islamic State,” Atlantic, January 3, 2016, http://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2016/01/isis-
indonesia-foreign-fighters/422403/; Kristen E. Schulze, “The Jakarta Attack and the Islamic State Threat to 
Indonesia,” CTC Sentinel 9, no. 1 (January 2016), 29. 
7 Navhat Nuraniyah, “How ISIS Charmed the New Generation of Indonesian Militants,” Middle East 
Institute, January 9, 2015, http://www.mei.edu/content/map/how-isis-charmed-new-generation-indonesian-
militants; IPAC, Evolution of ISIS, 19; Jones and Solahudin, “ISIS in Indonesia,”159. 
8 IPAC, Evolution of ISIS, 1. 
 3
foreign fighter numbers alone estimated to be as high as 30,000—these developments 
cause the Indonesian government much concern.9 Alarms stem from the sheer number of 
foreign fighters drawn to the conflict—numbering hundreds more and in half the time it 
took for the “Group of 272” who traveled to Afghanistan between 1984–1994; the 
formulation of a regionally networked Malayan based fighting unit within IS; direct calls 
from IS for support or the waging of jihad by Indonesians back home; and the extension 
of networks, influence, and support with radical jihadist domestic groups.10 All of these 
alarms have provided substantially different contexts and subsequent potential threats to 
national security and the Indonesian government than previous transnational terrorist 
actors such as AQ and Jemaah Islamiyah (JI).11  
C. POTENTIAL EXPLANATIONS AND HYPOTHESIS 
This thesis addresses the debate over whether Indonesian policy on transnational 
terrorism has been effective in combating the mobilization of radical Islamic groups. 
There are two prevailing arguments answering this question. The first argues that 
Indonesian CT efforts have been effective through increased state capacity by 
establishing governmental institutions/agencies and by the professionalization of law 
enforcement elements. Through these means, the Indonesian government has been able to 
successfully ratchet up its effectiveness against transnational elements and emergent 
threats.12 The second argument states that the Indonesian CT efforts and policies are 
ineffective in combating the mobilization of radical Islamic groups. This stems from the 
government’s lack of the implementation of a comprehensive CT program consisting of 
                                                 
9 Abuza, “Joining the Caravan”; Abdelhak Mamou, “ISIS Has 30,000 Foreign Fighters from More 
Than 100 Countries,” Iraqi News, May 29, 2015, http://www.iraqinews.com/arab-world-news/isis-30000-
foreign-fighters-100-countries/. 
10 Abuza, “Joining the Caravan”; Zachary Abuza, Political Islam and Violence in Indonesia (New 
York: Routledge, 2007), 67. 
11 Abuza, “Joining the Caravan”; Joseph Chinyong Liow, “ISIS Goes to Asia: Extremism in the 
Middle East Isn’t Only Spreading West,” Foreign Affairs, September 19, 2014, 
https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/east-asia/2014–09–19/isis-goes-asia; Yuliasri Perdani and Ina 
Parlina, “Government Bans Support, Endorsement of ISIL,” Jakarta Post, August 5, 2014, 
http://www.thejakartapost.com/news/2014/08/05/govt-bans-support-endorsement-isil.html. 
12 Sidney Jones, “Indonesian Government Approaches to Radical Islam since 1998,” in Democracy 
and Islam in Indonesia, ed. Mirjam Künkler and Alfred Stepan (New York: Columbia Univ. Press, 2013), 
120.  
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effective de-radicalization programs, prison reform, addressing religious intolerance and 
radical ideology, and rule of law.13 The lack of progress in these spheres furthers the 
ability of radical Islamic groups to evolve, regroup, and ultimately continue to threaten 
the state. The author proposes a hybrid, third theory wherein the extent of Indonesian CT 
efforts and policy effectiveness in combating the mobilization of radical Islamic groups 
through the criminal justice CT approach varies between ineffectiveness and 
effectiveness over time. Ineffectiveness has been witnessed through the inability to 
effectively combat the mobilization of radical Islamic groups. This is demonstrated by 
the persistent and continual re-emergence of radical jihadists as a viable threat to state 
security. Causal factors may be a lack of effective implementation of “soft” CT measures 
that adequately addresses: de-radicalization and disengagement programs, prison reform, 
religious intolerance and non-violent radical groups, and rule of law. On the other hand, 
effectiveness may be seen through the establishment and maintenance of requisite CT 
state capacities via law enforcement professionalization, adoption of anti-terrorism 
legislation, and the successful conduct of both “hard” and “soft” CT measures that when 
viewed in a cumulative and temporal manner represents a comprehensive CT strategy.14 
D. LITERATURE REVIEW 
Indonesia had long been praised for its moderate, non-radical Islamic practices 
and secular based approach toward governance.15 Following the fall of the Suharto 
                                                 
13 Jones, “Indonesian Government Approaches,” 120–25; Abuza, “Joining the Caravan”; Institute for 
Policy Analysis of Conflict, Countering Violent Extremism in Indonesia: Need for a Rethink (IPAC Report 
No. 11) (Jakarta: IPAC, 2014), 1; John Rollins, Al Qaeda and Affiliates: Historical Perspective, Global 
Presence, and Implications for U.S. Policy (CRS Report No. R41070) (Washington, DC: Congressional 
Research Service, 2011), 28–29, https://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/terror/R41070.pdf; Amy L. Freedman, 
“Islamic Extremism in Southeast Asia,” in The Routledge Handbook of Asian Security Studies, ed. Sumit 
Ganguly, Andrew Scobell, and Joseph Chinyong Liow (New York: Routledge, 2010), 269. 
14 Jones, “Indonesian Government Approaches,” 120–25; Abuza, “Joining the Caravan”; IPAC, 
Countering Violent Extremism, 1; Rollins, Al Qaeda and Affiliates, 28–29; Freedman, “Islamic 
Extremism,” 269. 
15 James Brandon, “Syrian and Iraqi Jihadis Prompt Increased Recruitment and Activism in Southeast 
Asia,” CTC Sentinel 7, no. 10 (October 2014): 19; Peter Chalk et al., The Evolving Terrorist Threat to 
Southeast Asia: A Net Assessment, Santa Monica: RAND, 2009), xiv; Andrée Feillard and Remy Madinier, 
The End of Innocence? Indonesian Islam and the Temptations of Radicalism, trans. Wong Wee (Honolulu: 
Univ. of Hawaii Press, 2011), 1; Adrian Vickers, A History of Modern Indonesia (New York: Cambridge 
Univ. Press, 2005), 1–2; Julie Chernov Hwang, “Terrorism in Perspective: An Assessment of ‘Jihad 
Project’ Trends In Indonesia,” AsiaPacific Issues, no. 104 (September 2012): 1–2. 
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regime in 1998 and the emergence of newly democratizing civil governance, events and 
actions by radical Islamic groups would undercut these notions.16 Just a few years into 
the 21st century, Indonesia was beginning to be seen as a struggling, democratizing 
nation facing radical Islamic influences and jihad.17 Chief among these initial 
developments was the widespread communal violence by newly established radical 
Islamic militias, laskars, flaring throughout the country in areas such as the Moluccas and 
Sulawesi.18 These developments were followed by a series of bombings from 2002 
through 2005 resulting in hundreds of foreign and indigenous civilian deaths.19 These 
acts were made all the more damning with the discovery of the transnational jihadist 
organization JI domestically based within Indonesia, whose affiliates would go on to 
conduct further bombings and planned plots in 2009.20 The succession of events all 
occurred within the immediate years following the attacks of 9/11 and the U.S. declared 
Global War on Terrorism (GWOT) with its invasions of Iraq and Afghanistan.21 To many 
analysts, the threat of transnational Islamic jihadism and radical Islamic ideology seemed 
to have found sanctuary on Indonesian soil from which future growth seemed assured.22 
Yet, despite the alarm and initial bloodshed, belief in a strengthening, democratic 
Indonesia would ultimately resonate with the Indonesian people. This sentiment was 
captured by Aspinall citing that over 75% of the voters for WiDoDo and 79% for 
Prabowo in the 2014 presidential elections agreed that, “democracy was ‘appropriate’ for 
                                                 
16 Robert W. Hefner, “Islamic Radicalism in a Democratizing Indonesia,” in The Routledge Handbook 
of Political Islam, ed. Shahram Akbarzadeh (New York: Routledge), 105. 
17 Greg Fealy, “Islamic Radicalism in Indonesia: the Faltering Revival,” Southeast Asian Affairs 
(2004): 104. 
18 Hefner, “Islamic Radicalism in a Democratizing Indonesia,” 105; Fealy, “Islamic Radicalism in 
Indonesia,” 109; Zachary Abuza, “Review of Noorhaidi Hasan’s Laskar Jihad: Islam, Militancy, and the 
Quest for Identity in Post-New Order Indonesia,” Contemporary Southeast Asia 29, no. 1 (April 2007): 
196–97. 
19 Bruce Vaughn et al., Terrorism in Southeast Asia (CRS Report No. RL34194) (Washington, DC: 
Congressional Research Service, 2009), 3–4, https://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/terror/RL34194.pdf. 
20 Ibid., 4. 
21 Ibid., 1–4; Freedman, “Islamic Extremism in Southeast Asia,” 263. 
22 Feillard and Madinier, End of Innocence, 1; Fealy, “Islamic Radicalism in Indonesia,” 104. 
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Indonesia.”23 This belief in democracy coupled with the government’s concerted CT 
efforts over the course of a decade and half eventually turned the tide. However, the 
radical and jihadist agendas survived, and would continue their trend of evolving 
organizational structures, tactics, and ideologies.24 This literature review will describe 
how Indonesian authorities responded to the transnational jihadist threat over the past 
decade and a half. The author will first trace the Indonesian authorities’ CT policies and 
efforts through three distinct timeframes reflecting the evolution of those efforts. Second, 
the investigation will describe areas of effectiveness and ineffectiveness; examining why 
those efforts were effective during one period and less effective in others. Finally, the 
author will consider causal factors for Indonesian CT ineffectiveness through describing 
the interconnectedness of non-violent and violent radical groups and the subsequent 
threat this poses. 
1. The Indonesian CT Response: Three Periods of CT Evolution 
The response of Indonesia to the threat of transnational terrorism is one that, 
much like the nature of the terrorist threat and structure of associated radical Islamic 
groups, has undergone fundamental changes since the country’s democratization in the 
post-Suharto years. These changes to the state response and subsequent policies have 
been reflective of the evolving attitudes of both the authorities and the public-at-large: 
from initial ardent dismissal to the eventual acknowledgement of transnational terrorism 
as a true threat to Indonesian national security.25 By analyzing the last decade and a half 
through three distinct timeframes of: I. 1998–2001, II. 2002–2008, and III. 2009–present, 
the interplay between the evolution of Indonesian CT efforts, the changing nature of the 
jihadist threat, and the dynamic role of public opinion will be charted. Within each 
timeframe three main concepts will be briefly analyzed: 1) the radical Islamic 
                                                 
23 Edward Aspinall, “Oligarchic Populism: Prabowo Subianto’s Challenge to Indonesian Democracy,” 
Indonesia, no. 99 (April 2015): 25, doi: 10.1353/ind.2015.0002. 
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transnational terrorist and domestic terrorist threat; 2) the counterterrorist response 
consisting of the politics, policies, and programs; and 3) assessment of the 
counterterrorism response. 
a. 1998–2001 
With the fall of the Suharto regime in 1998, the Indonesian government faced 
widespread communal, vigilante violence in many areas—Central Sulawesi, Maluku, and 
Maluku Utara, coupled with separatist movements in Aceh and East Timor.26 The 
cumulative effect and pressing urgency of these conflicts, responsible for thousands of 
deaths, damage to infrastructure, and general upheaval, masked the threats the 
transnational jihadist groups posed during this timeframe.27 The Indonesian government 
chalked up the incidents that did not target the government as normal criminal behavior 
bearing little substance and believed that the country did not suffer from a “terrorist 
problem.”28 According to Jones, the government, whose limited state capacity and 
resources were stretched thin, looked at the radical Islamists as a means and source by 
which control and order could be garnished within the troubled areas.29 The complicated 
nature of Indonesian radical Islam (interconnectedness of violent and non-violent radical 
groups), the attacks of 9/11, and the subsequent U.S. pressure to do more (identifying 
Indonesia’s radical groups as terrorists and calling for their disbandment by Indonesia) 
still did not cause great alarm and was viewed with general skepticism by both 
Indonesian authorities and the public at large.30 These combined views culminated with 
                                                 
26 Vickers, History of Modern Indonesia, 214–17; John T. Sidel, “Jihad and the Specter of 
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Asia and the Middle East: Islam, Movement, and the Longue Durée, ed. Eric Tagliacozzo (Stanford: 
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27 Vickers, History of Modern Indonesia, 218. 
28 Jones, “Indonesian Government Approaches,” 109–16. 
29 Ibid. 
30 Sidel, “Jihad and the Specter,” 275; Daljit Singh, “Trends in Terrorism in Southeast Asia,” in 
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Indonesia’s upfront but cautious support to U.S. initiatives.31 This timeframe ended with 
the conclusion of the vigilante and interreligious violence that had spread throughout 
much of Indonesia; thereby freeing Indonesian government assets and capabilities that 
would prove vital with the coming surge of jihadist attacks.32 
b. 2002–2008 
The timeframe of 2002 through 2008 would be critical for the Indonesian 
government as it would witness a general change in public sentiment against 
transnational terrorism. While successive bombings ravaged the country each year, the 
Bali bombing that killed and wounded over 200 people caused a massive decline in 
public support toward radical Islamists.33 After the 2002 Bali bombing by JI, Bali-I, the 
extent of its reach throughout Southeast Asia was uncovered by Indonesian national 
police who tracked down the assailants in concert with U.S. and Australian law 
enforcement agency support.34 Subsequently, for the first time, the government admitted 
that domestic—transnational terrorist groups, if left unchecked, could prove to be deadly 
threats to the Indonesian government and its citizens.35 This acknowledgment was 
followed in kind by two actions: 1) the establishment of a national police CT unit, 
Detasemen Khusus-88 (Densus-88), Detachment-88, and 2) sweeping arrests of terrorist 
suspects.36 As cited by Abuza and Jones, the establishment of Densus-88 was critical  
in setting the precedence of civil-police authority over the military regarding CT, an act 
that only increased tensions arising between the two state elements.37 As if anticipating 
the massive arrests, the Megawati government and Parliament further enacted an 
antiterrorism law in 2003 by which the Bali bombers and other jihadist affiliates were 
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successfully tried and jailed.38 Despite the gains made through enhanced CT efforts, this 
timeframe was still marked by a failure of the government to label radical groups, such as 
JI, as terrorists. This failure was due to a lingering fear of residual public sentiment 
holding the belief that these actions were part of the U.S. GWOT.39 
Following the previous bombings and in the wake of the second Bali bombing in 
2005 (Bali-II) public sentiment greatly turned against the terrorists yet again. This turn of 
opinion opened the door for the Indonesian authorities—in conjunction with CT support 
from the U.S. and Australian governments—to further make enhancement to law 
enforcement efforts. Gordon and Lindo asserted that this now meant politicians would be 
free for the most part from public backlash and negative press.40 
Years 2006 through 2008 represent nominal changes in Indonesian CT efforts. 
These efforts consisted primarily of continued arrests and incarcerations but was also a 
rebuilding timeframe for the terrorists as depicted by the surge in violence that would 
erupt in 2009. However, in a landmark decision during a trial in April 2008, a judge 
determined JI to be an illegal group, an action the government had tiptoed around until 
that time, but later utilized as a precedent in confronting IS.41 
c. 2009–Present 
The timeframe of 2009 to the present day has ushered in fundamental shifts in 
Indonesia’s outlook on the nature of the transnational jihadist threat. Following the 
Jakarta bombing in 2009 and the foiled assassination attempt on the president—executed 
and planned by Noordin Top’s ex-JI faction al-Qaeda for the Malay Archipelago 
(AQA)—Indonesia began to view transnational jihadist terrorism as an existential threat 
to national security.42 After the takedown of Top and many of his affiliates in a violent 
gunfight with national police, General Ansyaad Mbai was placed in charge of a new state 
                                                 
38 Jones, “Indonesian Government Approaches,” 117. 
39 Fealy and Borgu, Local Jihad; Vaughn et al., Terrorism in Southeast Asia, 1. 
40 Gordon and Lindo, Jemaah Islamiyah, 4. 
41 Vaughn et al., Terrorism in Southeast Asia, 10. 
42 Rollins, Al Qaeda and Affiliates, 27–29; Gordon and Lindo, Jemaah Islamiyah, 4; Vaughn et al., 
Terrorism in Southeast Asia, 4. 
 10
agency, the National Counter Terrorism Agency, Badan Nasional untuk Penanggulangan 
Terorisme (BNPT), to coordinate and formulate CT policy measures and 
implementation.43 Through the course of 2010 arrests were ramped up greatly numbering 
over 100 and reflecting actions that were seen previously over the course of 2003 in the 
wake of Bali-I.44 Though a great step forward, the organization has since been beset by 
inter-agency rivalry between police and military forces that has only complicated 
interagency cooperation, the distribution of state resources, and effective operational 
execution.45 
In the context of the rise and implications of IS, Indonesian authorities have taken 
marked steps beyond the standard approach of making arrests to counter the emergent 
threat. Following a call to arms video titled “Joining the Ranks” airing on You Tube July 
23, 2014 an Indonesian jihadist urged Indonesians to support another state entity, that of 
IS; a threat directly challenging notions of national loyalty and ethos of Pancasila.46 
State officials have outright issued a ban on IS support in August 2014 and President 
WiDoDo continues to mull over an interim emergency government regulation, perppu, 
that will further restrict IS support in the forms of: verbal support, overseas travel to 
support jihadist groups, and espousing jihadist ideology.47 Additionally, recent botched 
police arrests and failure to detect the 2009 assassination attempt of the president, not 
only resulted in the creation of the BNPT, but also raised questions about incorporating 
more of the Tentara Nasional Indonesia (TNI) within Indonesian CT efforts. Further 
incorporation of the TNI into the realm of domestic security raises additional questions as 
to the level of trust and confidence the government places within law enforcement efforts 
alone to contain and combat the jihadist threat.48 
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2. Indonesian CT: Effective or Ineffective Response? 
The Indonesian authorities’ response to the threat of transnational terrorism is as 
unique and infused with continual evolution as the terrorist organizations it purports to 
target. As demonstrated in the periodization of CT efforts and policies, the Indonesian 
government has established a pattern of reactive CT actions and policies. While effective 
in one time period, seen immediately following the wake of a terrorist attack, it often 
reverts to ineffectiveness in another. Here the initiative returns to the terrorists who 
evolve and adapt their means and ways to exploit the weaknesses of the government.49 
From all appearances, the Indonesian CT efforts have been effective, primarily 
through the focused efforts of professionalizing the police force as an effective, distinct, 
and separate entity from that of the military.50 Jones furthers this analysis through the 
context of the Indonesian presidencies and subsequent policies implanted under their 
tenure. Through this approach, Jones makes the claim that the acts of terrorism 
throughout the years, especially in the formative democratizing timeframe, had the 
reverse effect of strengthening and empowering the Indonesian government.51 The 
strength and empowerment resulted eventually in the manifestation of state capacity: the 
creation of CT agencies such as Densus-88 and institutions such as the BNPT.52 
Yet, on further investigation, the efforts may lack the full range of a cohesive and 
synchronized program wherein all aspects of government agencies and legal institutions 
are aligned under the same unity of effort.53 In lieu of the emergent threat of IS and its 
radical domestic supporters, the enhancement of CT efforts through legislative actions, 
the banning of IS support, are a pro-active attempt at pre-empting IS violence within 
Indonesia’s borders.54 
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Analysts such as Abuza, Rollins, and the Institute for Policy Analysis and 
Conflict (IPAC) assess the Indonesian government response to the threat in an 
incremental manner, with a focus on assessing government actions in relation to terrorist 
attacks and the evolving nature of the terrorists groups.55 A common approach by Abuza, 
Singt, and others is to focus on what Indonesia should be doing better, such as in areas of 
religious pluralism, and doing more to combat extremism without much context or 
substance behind the recommendations.56 However, these analysts joined by Jones and 
Freedman indicate that persistent themes of ineffectiveness transcending the three 
timeframes have consisted of de-radicalization programs, failed prison management 
reform, religious intolerance, and insufficient rule of law or effective anti-terrorism legal 
instrumentation.57 Jones states that the authorities began to implement the first of its de-
radicalization and disengagement programs with speaking tours by disengaged jihadists 
of a supposed “non-violent nature” in 2005 with hopes of changing their peers’ 
mindsets.58 In a CRS report in 2011, Rollins described these efforts as, “more cooptative 
in nature than ideological,” and that a large percentage of jihadists returned to jihadist 
activities upon release.59 Jones agrees, adding that additional measures and attention 
should be paid to the corruption inherent within the Indonesian government. This 
corruption, according to Jones, was critical in the procurement of arms, supplies, and 
movement of insurgents associated with the terrorist camp discovered in Aceh in 2010.60 
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3. Ineffectiveness Explored: The Radicals Have a Vote 
The ineffectiveness of Indonesian CT efforts may stem from an inability to 
acknowledge the interconnectedness of non-violent extremist groups and violent ones.61 
Jones captures this keenly stating that: 
Every arrest of a terrorist suspect…produces new information showing 
that extremist networks are more extensive than previously thought and 
that groups are constantly evolving and mutating, with older organizations 
like JI losing ground to new alliances.62 
The radicalized groups are varied, ranging from political organizations and laskars 
operating in the open, to domestic-transnational jihadists. Yet they are commonly linked 
by the thread of a desire for further Shari’a implementation.63 
Over the course of the last decade, radical Islam in Indonesia has evolved to 
include a marked increase in the use of non-violent means: an action that has thus 
allowed radical groups to survive and evolve out in the open within a modern 
democracy.64 The use of non-violent means is demonstrated by JI’s spiritual leader and 
co-founder Abu Bakar Ba’asyir’s moves in 2002–2003 to align JI with pro-establishment 
and political parties.65 Ramakrishna underlined the inherent dangers of such actions 
stating that: 
Only very recently have terrorism watchers based in the region conceded 
that while it’s true that holding extremist views doesn’t necessarily mean 
proclivity to violent action, it is equally a fact that belief in the ideology is 
a precursor to action for those who commit violence in the name of 
jihad.66 
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Non-violent, radical Islamic fundamentalist organizations, allowed to operate without 
constraint by the government, quite often have affiliated militant groups from which 
networking, recruitment from one to the other, and the enabling of working toward 
aligned objectives—increased Shari’a policy implementation—still occur.67 Examples of 
the complicated, interwoven networking include the conservative political group Majelis 
Mujahidin Indonesia’s (MMI) affiliated militant wing Laskar Mujahidin (LM) and JI’s 
Ba’asyir considered a prominent MMI member.68 
Indonesian authorities and analysts alike commonly argued that the direct ties 
between transnational jihadists, Indonesian transnational elements, and domestic radical 
Islamic groups, such as laskars and communal vigilante groups, were weak—if existing 
at all. This notion was once reinforced by Jones pointing to major ideological rifts and 
disparate objectives held by the overarching leaderships of the organizations as 
evidence.69 However, this may not be the case with the reverse evidence of closer, 
stronger network ties holding more water. This is due to the complexity of Indonesian 
radical Islamic networking and inherent evolutions of the organizations. Supporting 
evidence may be found in the case of the MMI and JI affiliations and AQ and JI 
supporting various laskars with funding and fighters in the Moluccas and Sulawesi 
conflicts of 1998 to the early 2000’s.70 Further radical group interconnectedness lie in the 
growing influence since 2007 of Hizb ut-Tahrir Indonesia (HTI)—a radical non-violent 
advocacy group—and the recent discovery of ties to a militant offshoot al-Muhajirun. Al-
Muhajirun not only has direct linkages to IS, but has played a coordinating role in the 
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recruitment of Indonesians to the jihadist organization’s cause.71 Therefore, the evidence 
suggests that the relationship between non-violent and violent organizations may have 
been and continues to be more tangible than originally thought.72 Numerous analysts 
acknowledge that the two may be in fact interrelated along lines of inter-networking and 
support, with radicalized domestic elements providing the context for the latter to rebuild, 
educate/train, recruit, and operate within.73 
4. Conclusion 
In summary, this literature review identified themes pertinent to the Indonesian 
authorities’ response to the transnational jihadist threat and mobilization of radical 
Islamic groups over the past decade and a half. First, the Indonesian authorities’ CT 
efforts and changing public opinion were analyzed through three distinct timeframes: I. 
1998–2001, II. 2002–2008, and III. 2009–present. This reflects the evolution of those 
efforts against the evolving jihadist threat. These timeframes were demarcated by events 
conducted by the terrorists and the subsequent reactions of the Indonesian government 
and public sentiment. By the time of the aftermath of the Bali-II bombing, public 
sentiment had turned against the Islamic jihadists and proved to be a critical component 
in the enhancement of Indonesian CT efforts. From 2009–present, the threat of 
transnational jihadism had re-emerged and was hard felt by the Indonesian public on 
multiple occasions yet again. Further negative public sentiment toward transnational 
jihadist terrorism enabled the government to further enhance state capacity with the 
creation of the BNPT and other CT efforts. In light of the acknowledged threat to national 
security that IS and its supporters posed, Indonesia would adopt pre-emptive measures 
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with the banning of IS support to contain and prevent transnational terrorism and the 
further mobilization of radical Islamic groups to the cause. 
Second, the CT areas of effectiveness and ineffectiveness, capturing why those 
efforts were effective during one period and less effective in others was described. Areas 
of effectiveness were linked to the professionalization of Indonesia’s law enforcement 
and creation of CT agencies such as Detachment 88 and BNPT. Ineffectiveness was 
linked to the lack of attention and resources to complimentary CT programs such as  
de-radicalization, prison reform, and legal reform. Finally, the author described 
Indonesian CT ineffectiveness by describing the potential linkage and interconnectedness 
of non-violent and violent radical Islamic groups and the subsequent threat they  
pose. This literature review further identified the need for additional research to more 
fully understand and explain why Indonesia’s CT policies and program as a whole  
has experienced timeframes of ineffectiveness and effectiveness over the past decade and 
a half. 
E. RESEARCH DESIGN AND METHODS 
In answering the question of whether a state’s policies on transnational terrorism 
are effective in combating the mobilization of radical Islamic groups, a single case study 
will provide the most detailed data and analysis by which both unique and general 
conclusions and methodologies may be drawn. Furthermore, through a temporal approach 
and breaking down the timeframe encompassing Indonesia’s shift to a democratic form of 
governance in 1998 to the present day into three distinct time-periods, the prominent 
political and social issues that were factored by state politicians and CT specialists may 
be seen. To date, Indonesia’s CT efforts, their effectiveness and ineffectiveness, have 
been mostly measured against the changing structure and nature of the threat posed by 
transnational and networked domestic radical Islamic groups. This has been performed 
incrementally and viewed in relation to the terrorists’ actions and evolutions. Conversely, 
the standpoint of viewing these radical groups’ evolutions and actions as reactions to 
public sentiments and state CT efforts has received little attention. It is the author’s aim 
that this investigation will identify the effective and ineffective policies by which 
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Indonesia may further direct CT support and resources in combatting the contemporary, 
re-emergent threat of transnational terrorism and the further mobilization of domestic 
radical Islamic groups. 
Within Southeast Asia, Indonesia contains the largest Islamic demographic with 
87.2% of its population of 255,993,674 and further constitutes the worlds’ largest Muslim 
population at approximately 12.7% of the global umma community.74 With such a large 
Muslim population, the dynamics and extremes of Islamic radicalization and its interplay 
within the confines of a modern and secular, democratic form of governance may readily 
be studied. Should even an extremely small percentage of the Indonesian populace 
become radicalized and vocal, the effects on Indonesian society, the political sphere, and 
Southeast Asian ethnic Malay and Muslim populations may be profound. Barton captures 
this sentiment when he stated that, “The pattern of history points to the fact that, even if it 
only directly affects a minute fraction of Indonesian society, the advent of Jemaah 
Islamiyah-al-Qaeda-style jihadi Islamism in the Indonesian archipelago marks a sea of 
change in Indonesian Islam.”75 
The Indonesian case study further contains the context by which all pertinent 
themes to the question may be studied: the origins and base of operations for the first 
transnational jihadist organization in Southeast Asia through JI, a myriad of loosely 
linked domestic radical Islamic groups with disparate goals and objectives, the historic to 
contemporary interactions with transnational jihadist terrorism, and the example of a 
states’ CT response to both transnational and domestic radical jihadists.76 The Indonesian 
CT policies and actions will be measured against the context of the desired end-states and 
subsequent results found in jihadist group evolutions, context of public sentiment at the 
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time, terrorist group lethality rate comparisons through statistical data available, and the 
major CT and terrorist actions that occurred. 
F. THESIS OVERVIEW 
This thesis will be organized into five chapters using the temporal analysis 
format. Following the first chapter, Chapters II, III, and IV will investigate Indonesian 
CT policy as it relates to transnational terrorism and radical Islamic groups captured 
through the three distinct timeframes of: 1998–2001, 2002–2008, and 2009–present. 
Within these timeframes, the threat(s) facing the Indonesian government, the state’s CT 
response, and an overall assessment of the timeframe will take place. Within each 
timeframe the evolution and overall effectiveness of the Indonesian CT program will be 
viewed through the influences and context of three primary factors: the changing nature 
and evolution of the jihadist groups, Indonesian CT response, and public opinion. 
The conclusion will provide a summary and synthesis of the author’s observations 
and findings during the research. Furthermore, the generalized observations and 
implications drawn from the Indonesian case study that may be applicable for utilization 
by countries facing the similar threats of transnational jihadism and domestic radical 
mobilization will be discussed. A step beyond for potential future research poses the 
question: does a correlation exist between the re-emergent rise of communal violence, the 
mobilization of radical jihadist groups, and transnational terrorist influences within 
specific regions of Indonesia exist, and if so, to what extent does this pose a threat to 
Indonesian unity, national security, and that of the region today? 
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II. 1998–2001: A MATTER OF STATE SOVEREIGNTY 
AND INTEGRITY 
A. THE THREAT OVERVIEW 
In August of 2000, former President Wahid addressed the People’s Consultative 
Assembly stating that a, “Wave of disintegration is threatening the existence of the 
unitary state and national unity.”77 As the Suharto regime fell in 1998 and during the 
proceeding years of the nation’s ascent toward democratic governance, Indonesia faced a 
myriad of diverse and widespread domestic pressures that would pose significant threats 
to national sovereignty and integrity. Two main threats would emerge during this 
timeframe predicated around the sudden and sharp rise of the use of political violence by 
domestic actors. The first consisted of increased provincial public sentiment in favor of 
political action through violent and non-violent means for new and decades old separatist 
movements in areas such as East Timor, Ambon, Aceh, and Papua.78 The second would 
be associated with the widespread surge of communal, vigilantism erupting between 
Christians and Muslims and the subsequent rise of militant Islamic laskars, militias.79 
Overshadowed by these two pressing threats yet omnipresent in the shadows was the 
growing power and overall threat posed by transnationally linked, domestic based 
terrorism by radical Islamic Jihadists.80 The primary domestic threats and pressures while 
leading the government to further ignore the threat of transnational terrorism would 
ultimately assist in the establishment of the government’s criminal justice CT approach 
through the narrowing of the TNI’s main directives and establishment of civil 
institutional capacity. 
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Together, the armed separatist movements and communal, laskar-driven conflicts 
would be responsible for the deaths of an estimated 22,000 civilians and combatants, 
nearly two million displaced persons, untold damages to infrastructure, and general 
upheaval across the country.81 The cumulative effect and pressing political urgency of the 
two main sources of conflict would not only transfix the nation’s attentions, but call for 
the allocation of its scant resources and limited capacities. Furthermore, these combined 
domestic pressures masked the threat to national security and further enabled the 
conditions for increased mobilization of the networked domestic and transnational 
jihadist groups during this timeframe and in the immediate years that followed.82 
1. Separatist Movements Emboldened 
Suharto’s swift departure and the ensuing political turmoil that was compounded 
by weak civil state institutions, left much room for movements within many provinces 
with long held desires for autonomy or independence to make their bids once again.83 
Some of these movements had been longstanding such as those of East Timor, Aceh, and 
Papua (Irian Jaya) while others saw these sentiments gaining new ground in areas such as 
Riau and Ambon.84 Fueling the separatist sentiments within both new and old movements 
within these provinces were grievances based over natural resource exploitation and the 
lack of fair treatment economically and politically by the central government.85 East 
Timor would be the first and only province to receive outright independence from 
Indonesia following the urging and assistance of the international community coupled 
with a United Nations supervised referendum in 1999 that saw 78% of East Timorese 
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voting for independence.86 This independence for the Timorese would come at a high 
cost and not before the violence between the Indonesian military, pro-Indonesian 
militias—the Mahidi, Besi Merah Putih and Aitarak Militia—and anti-Indonesia militias 
resulted in over 2,000 lives lost and the displacement of nearly 850,000 persons.87 
Subsequently, the loss of East Timor would further galvanize and harden the resolve of 
both the Indonesian public and the government to retain at all costs the remaining 
sovereign borders of Indonesia.88 
Separatist sentiments in Aceh province had run deep dating back to the Dar-ul 
Islam, Abode of Islam, Insurgency between 1948–62, wherein Acehnese rebels joined the 
forces of the movement’s leader Kartosiwirjo from 1953–58 against the secular, 
nationalist forces of the Republic under Sukarno.89 Autonomous concessions were given 
to the region by the Republic then and would only strengthen independence minded 
feelings in the years to come.90 Since late 1976, the movement took on an armed struggle 
through the formation of the Free Aceh Movement or Gerakan Aceh Merdeka (GAM). 
Through the use of brute force Suharto mobilized the Indonesian military and turned 
Aceh into a militarized zone.91 With approximately 12,000 troops the Indonesian military 
was able to mitigate GAM’s effects but not without the cost of thousands of civilian lives 
in the process.92 On the eve of Suharto’s departure in 1998, the discovery of mass graves 
brought forth again the dormant Jakarta-focused resentments. These resentments 
manifested into further recruitment and support for GAM—reaching as many as 10,000 
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members—as well as the creation of the university student based, non-violent activist 
group the Aceh Referendum Information Center (SIRA) in 1999.93 That same year, SIRA 
would go on to organize a mass demonstration with upwards of 1 million of the 4 million 
provincial residents.94 During this timeframe, GAM’s use of guerrilla-insurgent and 
terrorism based tactics enabled them to dominate the rural areas while  
the Indonesian Army controlled the main urban centers—a situation similar to that 
experienced during the DI insurgency over three decades prior.95 
In 2000, a ceasefire was brokered between the government and GAM leadership 
yet the fighting continued sporadically.96 From 1998 to 2001, the escalation of the 
movement and fighting approached the loss of nearly 3,000 lives.97 In addition, GAM 
accounted for 33% of the total terrorist attacks perpetrated against the Indonesian 
government, as seen in Figure 1, that killed 106 and wounded another 124. Ranging from 
bombings and small arms attacks, these strikes demonstrated an average lethality rate of 
2.6 casualties per attack, as seen in Figure 2.98 
The charts depicted within the following figures were created from data adapted 
from the National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism’s 
(START’s) Global Terrorism Database (GTD) GTD-2 data sets from years 1998 to 2014. 
The GTD-2 data set defined terrorist attacks meeting the following criteria: 
1. The violent act was aimed at attaining a political, economic, religious, 
or social goal; 2. The violent act included evidence of an intention to 
coerce, intimidate, or convey some other message to a larger audience (or 
audiences) other than the immediate victims; and 3. The violent act was 
outside the precepts of International Humanitarian Law.99 
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To maintain the integrity of the data set, categorizations of suspected or attributed 
perpetrators established by GTD were maintained by the author such as “Muslim 
extremist” and “Muslim fundamentalist,” due to the inability to attribute these categories 
to align either as a separatist, radical Islamic vigilante, domestic or transnational terrorist 
group. The use of “lethality rate”—the resulting number configured through dividing the 
total number of attacks attributed to a specific group by the combined total of the 
resulting killed and wounded—was similar in design and adapted from de Graaf’s use of 
the concept to capture the level of an attack’s effectiveness.100 
 
Figure 1.  Terrorist Attacks by Group, 1998–2001. 
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Figure 2.  Average Lethality Rate per Terrorist Attack, 1998–2001. 
Within the Protestant majority province of West Papua—while not nearly as 
costly in lives and property damage as the Free Aceh Movement—resentment toward 
Jakarta and its policies remerged in 1998.101 Dating back to its inception in 1965, the 
movement was based on armed resistance with the establishment of the separatist group 
Free Papua Organization (OPM). While much of the 1970s and early 1980s saw bloody 
fighting with Indonesian forces, the 1990s would see the movement add a non-violent 
protest element with the inclusion of a Papuan political activist organization to achieve 
political ends.102 Despite the addition of the non-violent base of support, OPM mounted a 
small series of terrorist attacks causing minor damages to property and wounding six 
people.103 As shown in Figure 1, these attacks only accounted for 1.5% of the total 
terrorist attacks faced by Indonesia during the timeframe of 1998–2001; yet, these strikes 
demonstrated an average lethality rate of 1.5 casualties per attack as seen in Figure 2.104 
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2. Communal Violence and the Mobilization of Islamic Laskars 
The second major threat to the national integrity of the newly democratizing 
nation was the sharp emergence of communal, vigilante violence throughout the country 
in areas such as Central Sulawesi, Kalimantan, Maluku, and Maluku Utara.105 The 
communal violence that erupted and the threat it posed to Indonesian state unity can best 
be understood through the context of four variables: 1. the emergence of hardline ethno-
religious radical groups; 2. the links to radical transnational Jihadist actors; 3. the main 
issues at the root of the conflicts; and 4. how this drama played out through the example 
of the conflict within the Molukus. 
Prior to his fall from power, Sukarno relaxed the suppression of Islamic 
organizations in a final bid to retain control and power following the economic crisis of 
1998 and declining support of political elites.106 This action inadvertently opened the 
door for the rapid establishment and further involvement of Islamic organizations and the 
rapid establishment of numerous Islamic political parties within Indonesian society 
throughout the late 1990s.107 
The increased Islamization within Indonesian society took on two principal forms: 
the first through moderate, democratically or civic based and the second through 
orthodox, fundamentalist based. Then and now, the vast majority of Indonesian Muslims 
retain membership within the two dominant and moderate Islamic based organizations: 
the Nahdatul-Ulama (NU) and the Muhammadiyah Islamic civic organization. These 
groups espouse nonviolence, tolerance, are secular-democratically oriented, and contain 
memberships in the tens of millions of Indonesians—purported to be approximately 85–
90% of the population.108 Islamic radical hardliners or orthodox fundamentalists would 
be drawn to organizations such as the Indonesian Komite Indonesia Untuk Solidaritas 
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degan Dunia Islam (KISDI)—’Committee for Solidarity With the World of Islam’—the 
Dewan Daah Islamiyah Indonesia (DDII)—’Indonesian Council for Islamic 
Predication.’109 The Majelis Mujahedeen Indonesia, a radical umbrella group for 
multiple radical Islamic organizations established by Abu Bakar Ba’ashir in 1999, would 
further establish and enable networking ties for Islamic militant groups such as Laskar 
Jihad (LJ) and Islamic Defender’s Front (FPI).110 Over the course of this timeframe, the 
MMI was able to gather approximately 100 of these groups under its wing with the 
establishment of 30 branches throughout the country. While operating in the political 
sphere in an open manner, the list of supporters and members were never maintained on 
file to prevent any future potential incriminations.111 Ba’ashir, later to be associated as 
the spiritual leader of JI, was quoted by Reardon as stating, “The MMI is an institution 
where a lot of people gather at the table to discuss how to get our vision of shari’a 
implemented into national laws…As long as Muslims are the majority, the country 
should be ruled by shari’a.”112 
While the design, scope, and membership of the militias varied, groups like LJ 
were believed to harbor desires for the establishment of an Islamic State or at a minimum 
the increased implementation of shari’a, Islamic law, throughout all of Indonesia.113 
Despite these desires and containing members with multiple laskar and radical group 
memberships or affiliations, LP and FPI leadership held fast to the principle that it was 
wrong to utilize armed force against a Muslim state regardless of how corrupt it was 
perceived to be. These groups possessed ultra-nationalist leanings and saw themselves as 
the true defenders of state integrity where and when the state could not do so itself.114 
                                                 
109 Paul James Carnegie, “Is Militant Islamism a Busted Flush in Indonesia?” Journal of Terrorism 
Research 4, no. 2 (September 2013), doi: 10.15664/jtr.563. 
 110 Reardon, “Interpreting Political Islam’s Challenge,” 202–03; “Indonesia’s Terrorism Links”; 
Carnegie, “Militant Islamism.” 
111 Gordon P. Means, Political Islam in Southeast Asia (Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 2009), 171. 
112 Reardon, “Interpreting Political Islam’s Challenge,” 203.  
113 Ibid., 202; “Indonesia’s Terrorism Links”; Paul J. Carnegie, “Latent Insurgency: Is the Threat of 
Militant Islamist Groups in Indonesia Diminishing?” in Insurgency and Counterinsurgency in Modern War, 
ed. Scott Nicholas Romaniuk and Stewart Tristan Webb (Boca Raton, FL: CRC Press, 2016), 127. 
114 Arabinda Acharya, Whither Southeast Asia Terrorism? (Hackensack, NJ: Imperial College Press, 
2015), 71. 
 27
Conversely to the mobilization of pro-Indonesia laskars, other laskars such as 
Laskar Jundullah (LJu) and its leader Agus Dwikarna outlined designs on how to achieve 
the condition of an Islamic State through a four phased short-term and long-term 
approach with the assistance of AQ funding and training. Phase-one consisted of 
sabotage operations throughout the archipelago to further sow disorder; Phase-two 
consisted of coopting and coercing TNI and POLRI (National Police) members; Phase-
three consisted of infiltrating and coercing political and civil organizations to the cause; 
and the long term phase, Phase-four, consisted of expanding the laskar to a 10,000 man 
force and furthering linkages and ties to transnational, Philippine radical groups such as 
Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG).115 
The radical and militant training of many laskar members and leaders stemmed 
from two primary sources: first, Wahahabi-Salafist networks throughout the Middle East, 
and second, actual combat or training experiences gained during the Soviet-Afghan War 
by Indonesian and Southeast Asian foreign fighters.116 These experiences abroad and 
subsequent networking coupled with domestic linkages stemming from the DI 
insurgency—wherein remaining insurgents had gone underground during the Suharto and 
Sukarno years—further enabled the possession of broad based radical Islamic ties and 
linkages.117 While not a fully encompassing list, Table 1 demonstrates the growth and 
captures some of the linkages formed between domestically based and oriented radical 
Islamic groups, their militant offshoots, and transnational jihadist actors over this 
timeframe and beyond.118 
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Table 1.   Indonesian Radical Islamic Groups.119 
 
 
The violent communal conflicts generally hinged around ethno-religious strife 
and the vying for domestic political and economic power between Christian and Muslim 
elites as the centralized government began devolving power down to the district levels.120 
In the wake of rising separatist sentiments and minorities pressing for further political, 
social, and economic mobility and control, violent clashes between what was at first 
spontaneous mobs turned more and more violent and edged on outright civil war. Local 
ethno-religiously inspired political elites mobilized the public into radical, militant camps 
to contest for power and establish order within the void left by government inaction.121 
As depicted in Figure 1, the terrorist attacks committed by LJ, FPI, and Muslim 
extremists during this timeframe accounted for 6% of all known and attributed  
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terrorist attacks.122 These attacks demonstrated an average lethality rate of 2 LJ, 4 FPI, 
and 8.7 casualties per attack for LJ, FPI, and Muslim extremists, respectively, as 
demonstrated in Figure 2.123 
Communal strife within the Moluku islands, specifically surrounding the city  
of Ambon, would become one of the most violent and bloody of all, and further 
demonstrates the unique political and social complexities involved within these conflicts. 
The demographics of Ambon consisted of one favoring Christian protestants, to include 
the offices of provincial governance, until Muslim immigration resulted in a more even 
split.124 By 1999, Ambonese Christian Protestants touted the idea of forming a separate 
Christian state. Later that year, Kao villagers attacked and killed hundreds of Muslims 
and displaced another 10,000.125 Indonesian public sentiment subsequently became 
enraged over the highly publicized incident. This public sentiment fanned the passions 
and desires of a demonstration with numbers peaking around 100,000 within Jakarta 
decrying for the declaration of a “Holy War” on behalf of Maluku’s Muslims.126 In 
response to this growing communal violence, in 2000 LJ mobilized and dispatched 
approximately 3,000 militants to thwart the Christian moves and hopefully gain the upper 
hand of placing the province’s political scene firmly within Muslim hands.127 
3. Growing Power of Transnational Terrorist Networks 
With the states’ attention focused on the pervasive threats of separatism and to a 
lesser extent communal violence, an environment in which both domestic and 
transnational jihadist radical actors (JI and AQ) could further manifest within Indonesia 
was enabled.128 The manifestation of Jihadist activities would be attributed to three 
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additional factors: the permissive or enabling environments provided by the communal 
violence, radical Islamic networking, and the conduct of terrorist attacks. 
First, the communal violence between Christians and Muslims transpiring all over 
the country from Kalimantan, Sulewasi, and the Molukus provided both the religious 
context and the physical arena for these transnationally oriented jihadists to mobilize, 
infiltrate, and operate within. These arenas subsequently allowed for JI to further 
entrench critical components of its unique, regionalized cell structure finally onto 
Indonesian soil. This complex structure complete with “sleeper cells” consisted of four 
Mantiqis or regional divisions: (I) Malaysia, South Thailand, and Singapore; (II) Java and 
Sumatra; (III) the Philippines, Brunei, East Malaysia, Kalimantan, Sulawesi, and Maluku; 
and (IV) Papua and Australia.129 Mantiqis II and III were critical nodes responsible for 
managing and executing JI’s training, fund raising, and recruitment.130 From these 
Mantiqis and with Indonesia established as its base, JI would not only begin the process 
of attempting to usher in the Daulah Islamiyah Nusantara, the Islamic State, but an 
expanded version of a wider pan-regional caliphate encompassing Malaysia, the 
Philippines, Thailand, Singapore, Brunei, and Cambodia called the Darulah Islamiah 
Raya.131 
Second, the longstanding and newly created relationships or network linkages 
further reinforced both the means and ways of conducting armed attacks through training, 
monetary resources, and logistics for its members and further tactical opportunities that 
complemented operational and strategic aims.132 Through these interactions, JI’s 
credibility or “jihadi clout,” its transnational jihadist ideology, and recruitment of 
additional members were demonstrated, gained, or further cemented. Throughout these 
conflicts some figures reported JI having trained as many as 2,000 combatants of 
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Indonesian and foreign descent by 2003’s end.133 It is unclear, however, whether these 
numbers were included within or in addition to JI’s self-declared membership of 2,000 
jihadists and over 5,000 sympathizers within this timeframe.134 
Third, beginning in 2000 this timeframe saw the initial ramp up of jihadists 
utilizing terrorism as a tactic through the conduct of terrorist attacks that would later be 
attributed to JI and AQ.135 The targeting of these attacks ranged from foreign, 
transnational targets such as the Philippine ambassador (August 2000) to domestic, state 
institutions such as the Jakarta Stock Exchange (September 2000) and the simultaneous 
bombings of 11 to as many as 30 Christian churches in different Indonesian cities—West 
Java, Riau, Bandung, East Java, Nusatenggara, Medan, Northern Sumatra, and Batam 
Island—during Christmas Eve services (December 2000).136 During this timeframe, the 
tactical level influences imparted by AQ and other transnationally linked groups’ could 
be seen within the domestic attacks. These consisted of near simultaneously occurring, 
multiple complex-attacks involving small arms and explosives.137 As demonstrated in 
Figure 1, transnational groups accounted for 15% of the terrorist attacks during this 
timeframe and further demonstrated an average lethality rate of 3.9 casualties per attack 
per Figure 2.138 
B. THE STATE RESPONSE 
To the disparate threats facing the country, the Indonesian government would 
respond through the employment of both hard and soft CT measures. Hard measures 
would be implemented predominantly through the use of the Indonesian army, Tentara 
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Nasional Indonesia and conduct of kinetic actions and operations against the separatists. 
Conversely, soft measures through diplomacy consisting of concessions and negotiations 
were utilized against both separatists and the laskars at the domestic levels with a more 
laissez faire approach toward the latter. Additionally, despite not addressing and 
acknowledging transnational radical Islamic terrorism within its own borders at this time, 
Indonesia employed diplomacy as it entered into numerous international level 
cooperative agreements addressing the threat of transnational terrorism through 
multilateral agreements within the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN).139 
1. Separatist Carrots and Sticks 
With maintaining the integrity of the country at the forefront of public and 
government sentiments and prioritization, the separatist movements—Aceh Province 
specifically—were dealt with via the hands of the TNI. While employing a two-pronged 
approach encompassing both hard and soft CT measures, the emphasis under the TNI was 
that of hard CT measures. By 2003, the failure of soft CT measures such as the 2000 
cease-fire, the escalation of terrorist attacks by GAM, and increased skirmishes with the 
TNI further resolved the government to place Aceh under martial law and to sanction the 
launch of a new military offensive with nearly 30, to 40,000 soldiers backed by heavy air 
and mechanized support in a bid to stamp out armed resistance for good.140 
As in Aceh, West Papua would come to feel the weight of Jakarta’s soft and hard 
CT measures. In 2000, the anniversary of the West Papuan independence, additional 
troops and anti-separatist legislation were imposed such as a ban on flying the West 
Papuan flag.141 As a result the fighting would continue between OPM and the TNI, albeit 
on a sporadic, low-level scale.142 Yet, where the soft measures seemed to fail in Aceh, 
they appeared to garner some traction in Papua. Under Megawati in 2001, the Indonesian 
House of Representatives finally voted in favor of legislation providing “special 
                                                 
139 Acharya, Whither Southeast Asia, 148. 
140 Reardon, “Interpreting Political Islam’s Challenge,” 202; Holt, “Indonesia and the Global War,” 
454. 
141 Malley, “Indonesia: Erosion of State,” 202. 
142 Acharya, Whither Southeast Asia, 255. 
 33
autonomy” to the province. These special autonomous provisions, generally more lenient 
than those offered elsewhere, addressed the base anti-Jakarta grievances in the spheres of 
natural resources—with a higher percentage of revenue retention by the province—and 
political concessions unique to the Papuan case—the retention of the seat of governor by 
native Papuans only.143 
2. A Tempered Approach toward Islamic Extremism: The Militant 
Laskars 
Unlike the government’s military led CT approach predominantly utilized to 
respond to the separatist movements, it took a laissez-faire approach—one of 
collaboration and appeasement—with the radical Islamic groups. This tempered policy of 
appeasement was subsequently rooted in and the result of three factors: the lack of 
political clout within the government, the high level of visibility Islamization was seen to 
have had throughout the greater society, and the government’s need for the use of the 
radical Islamic militias to restore order until dependable, state entities could be utilized. 
The altering of this strategy of appeasement toward one of government action would be 
effected only after increased pressures by the U.S. in the wake of the attacks of 9/11. 
One of the first legislative actions passed in the wake of Suharto’s hasty departure 
in 1998 was the overturning of the 1963 UU Anti-Subversi, Anti-Subversion Laws, laws 
that had been utilized by the government to suppress communist and radical Islamic 
groups such as DI.144 For the first time in decades, the more radical Islamic groups that 
were formally repressed, discredited, and forced underground could now mobilize and act 
in the open. To this Feillard and Madinier remarked, “For radical Islam, this period was 
the age of possibilities.”145 With the move toward democracy coupled with the rise of 
political and fundamentalist Islam throughout many spheres of society, Indonesian 
politicians were overly sensitive to not being viewed as “more open” toward opposition 
parties and groups. Thus, the government was unable and even unwilling to be seen as 
going back on such a critical, democratic principle. Furthermore, it could ill afford the 
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potential for any political and social backlash such actions could potentially draw forth 
and further incite within the public.146 
By looking the other way the weak central government and successive waves of 
presidential administrations allowed for the militant, vigilante, and radical groups to 
establish order in many areas with contentious politically and socially charged conflicts. 
Such use was demonstrated often during this timeframe as seen in 1998 with President 
Habibie’s call for the radical militants’ protection of the People’s Consultative Assembly 
(MPR) and again with the government’s tacit failure to stop their initial use in the 
communal conflicts erupting nationwide throughout the early 2000s.147 In addition to the 
government’s initial indifference, the TNI and police at the local and national levels 
seemed ambivalent at best. This was demonstrated when three leaders of LJ appeared 
before President Wahid declaring their support and intention to deploy jihadist fighters to 
the Molukus and other regions. Despite the president’s refusal and ordering of the TNI to 
intervene and stop their movement, LJ fighters were not only unhindered in their 
movements but also provided government owned ships and were transported to the 
conflicts.148 Further accusations of TNI and local police led training, arms supplies, 
monetary payoffs, and collusion with the laskars soon surfaced in these regions.149 From 
Kalimantan, Sulawesi, to the Molukus, police and TNI security forces generally stood 
aside as the communal conflicts and violence erupted all around them.150 
The pressures by the U.S. in years following the events of 9/11 played heavily on 
the government’s change of strategy in dealing with the communal conflicts. In the wake 
of the attacks by AQ on America, mounting reports began to surface of existing network 
linkages through membership and logistical-financial support between many of the 
Islamic militias—LJ, LMI, FPI, and LPI—and AQ that were raised by U.S. officials, 
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fellow ASEAN members (Singapore and Malaysia) and various news agencies.151 
Despite the Megawati government being one of the first dignitaries to appear in 
Washington with condolences after the 9/11 attacks and subsequent pledges to assist U.S. 
Global War on Terrorism efforts—backed by a historic economic aid package of $650 
million—the resolve both in the Indonesian cabinet and wider public sentiments 
supporting those ends was substantially different.152 
Commiserate with the increase of U.S. military and CT actions in the early years 
of GWOT, anti-U.S. rhetoric increasingly emanated from large swaths of the Indonesian 
public, radical Islamic groups, Islamic laskars, and even government cabinet members 
such as Vice President Hamzah Haz.153 This rhetoric consisted of Indonesian public 
views seeing the “War on Terror” as a “War on Islam”—enflamed by U.S. continued 
support to Israel, military actions in Afghanistan and Iraq, and later U.S. rhetoric of 
Southeast Asia as a “Second Front in the War on Terror”—were further compounded by 
growing resentment toward Jakarta for its lack of condemning these U.S. actions.154 
Cumulatively these anti-U.S. sentiments made the government’s abilities to respond to 
the mobilization of radical Islamic groups all the more politically volatile. Thus the extent 
of the Indonesian government’s resolve to combat the mobilization of radical Islamic 
groups and transnational terrorists surfaced yet again. 
The combined political pressures from internal and external elements forced the 
Megawati government’s hand to attempt to tone down the public’s rhetoric by releasing 
relatively anti-U.S. statements of its own disagreeing with certain aspects of GWOT 
(invasions of Afghanistan and Iraq), rallying the moderate Islamic voices of NU and 
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Muhammadiyah, and taking measured CT actions that resulted in the interrogations of 
numerous laskar fighters and members.155 Additionally, Indonesian officials 
subsequently began a campaign of engagement and negotiation with all parties.156 Going 
into the early 2000s, one by one the communal conflicts would begin to peter out. The 
government began to replace corrupted local police and military units with increased 
visits by government officials to coordinate the laskars to leave the regions, and the 
concluding of fragile peace agreements between Muslims and Christians such as the 
Malino I and II accords in Poso, Sulawesi.157 This was seen in the Molukus on February 
12, 2002 when the Indonesian military finally acted and instituted a neutral zone between 
the warring factions. A measure that came “too little, too late” as the conflict saw the 
killing of an estimated 5,000 people and the displacement of nearly 800,000 others.158 
3. Transnational Terrorism 
The response by the government to the rise of transnational jihadists would be 
profoundly different than that to the separatists, laskars, and radical Islamic groups. The 
blatant denial to the existence of terrorists within its borders would be the government’s 
official stance, predicated upon the tenuous and strained conditions of the domestic 
political and social atmospheres. Despite this, the state still embarked upon taking 
measures through entities such as ASEAN that would establish the frameworks and begin 
the process of shifting regional behavioral and cooperative norms. These agreements, 
while not achieving anything of great tangible substance during this timeframe, would 
prove vital in the years to come in combating transnational terrorism. 
In December of 2001, Lieutenant General A.M. Hendropriyono, the Indonesian 
National Intelligence Agency Chief, made the announcement that intelligence gathered 
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pointed to the presence of AQ and other transnational terrorists being behind both the 
training of radical jihadists within Indonesia and the communal violence breaking out in 
Sulawesi.159 Despite this and other mounting evidence of the transnational jihadist 
presence within Indonesian borders with growing networks, membership recruitment, 
financing, and training with AQ elements, the government simply ignored and disavowed 
such statements and warnings as unsubstantiated.160 Furthermore, Indonesia’s first 
civilian defense minister Juwono Sudarsono rebuffed U.S. assistance to prevent further 
AQ incursions into the Indonesian radical scene as early as 2000. Former U.S. 
Ambassador to Indonesia, Ambassador Gelbard, assessed the Indonesian government’s 
views on terrorism during this timeframe: 
We found that even as terrorist groups in Indonesia were making 
themselves quite evident through their actions, and even announcing their 
intentions, there was a very conscious effort on the part of the government 
to ignore their actions and refuse to take any kind of measures against 
them… Their failure to move only allowed these groups to grow and 
consolidate themselves.161 
While gradually ratcheting up its response in its own way to radical Islamic laskars, the 
political situation was so precarious that a crackdown on suspected transnationally linked 
radical jihadists through hard CT measures was not possible nor even likely 
achievable.162 Furthermore, the government lacked clarity as to who exactly the 
“transnationally linked” or radical jihadists terrorists could be. As seen in Figures 1 and 
2, the sheer number of potential offenders for enacting the violence and terrorist attacks 
that appeared within this timeframe was staggering. Culprits ranged from separatists, 
criminal gangs, militant laskars—seen as the manifestations of the TNI—to attacks 
simply found unattributed—a common occurrence in Indonesian terrorist attacks. These 
diverse options enabled the government to blame the most self-benefitting options: 
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political rivals or the TNI who were believed to be grasping at straws in a bid to retain 
power and influence.163 
With concrete, hard CT measures generally off the table, Indonesia did pursue 
measures during this time to address transnational terrorism through the multilateral 
cooperative agreement approach via ASEAN. The ASEAN multilateral cooperative 
agreements would address the issue of “transnational crime” of which terrorism would be 
specifically mentioned. The agreements agreed upon predominantly focused on the 
prevention and combating of terrorist acts within specific CT arenas such as the 
commercial aviation sector and attempts by terrorists to weaponize chemical and 
biological agents. Other agreements consisted of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty 
(1996), International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism 
(1999), and two resolutions of the Security Council (1368/2001 and 1373/2001).164 This 
timeframe further saw the Declaration on Joint Action to Counter Terrorism, signed by 
all ASEAN members including Indonesia at the 7th ASEAN Summit meeting in 
November 2001, that saw and declared transnational terrorism as a, “Profound threat to 
international peace and security.”165 Yet even here, Indonesia’s tempered approach and 
its conscious recognition of the political volatility stemming from its domestic situation 
ensured that religion was not directly attributed to terrorism through the declaration 
having, “Rejected any attempt to link terrorism with any religion or race.”166 These 
collective measures would plant the seed for further cooperation, whether bilaterally or 
multilaterally within the region and internationally, but would have further implications 
with the subsequent transnational jihadist attacks that would transpire both within 
Indonesia and Southeast Asia from 2002 and beyond. 
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C. ASSESSMENT 
This timeframe, one filled with the threat of armed separatist movements, 
communal violence, and rise of militant laskars and radical Islamic groups, cumulatively 
set the conditions for the growing power and further manifestation of transnational 
jihadist actors. While public sentiment was inherently focused on suppressing the 
separatists within the political and societal spheres, it also became more aware of the 
growing presence of Islamization and Islamic radical groups throughout the country. 
With the attacks of 9/11, professed Indonesian support to the U.S., external international 
pressures, and internal domestic developments that affected the government’s ability to 
act, the government would adopt at first a rather passive CT approach. As Pedahzur and 
Perliger quoted Qualter, “While public opinion does not govern, it may set limitations on 
what governments do.”167 Yet despite these sentiments and time of political volatility, the 
state was able to lay the foundations of a criminal justice based CT program. These 
measures would later prove critical in its abilities to wage an effective CT program 
against the emergent threat of transnational jihadist terrorism. 
The two main threats to national sovereignty and integrity faced by the state 
during this timeframe, separatist movements and intra-communal violence, would lead 
Indonesia to utilize its limited resources and capacities to safeguard the unity and 
integrity of the state first and foremost. These threats were representative of both vertical 
and horizontal threat types.168 The traditional, vertical threat was demonstrated with the 
armed separatist groups within the movements of Aceh and Papua that were levied 
directly against the state and would therefore imperil state integrity. The viewing of these 
threats as paramount and the subsequent allocation by the government of its scant 
resources against them appears justified given both the preponderance of the high number 
of combined associated terrorist attacks at 97, 36% of those experienced by Indonesia as 
seen in Figure 1, and average lethality rate of 2 casualties per attack resulting from the 
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approximately 255 killed or wounded.169 To this threat, the government decided on the 
clear distinctive use of hard CT approaches through the TNI with intermittent use of soft 
approaches, such as negotiations and the provision of autonomous concessions to achieve 
a peaceful resolution. Aceh’s autonomous provisions would come on the heels of the 
TNI’s final military operation in 2003 and the devastating tsunami that struck the 
province in 2004, which were captured within the Helsinki Accords of 2005.170 Despite 
receiving autonomy, West Papua would continue to see the harboring of grievances 
against the government and the existence of an armed struggle through OPM conducting 
terrorist attacks until the present day.171 
Conversely to the vertical threat of the separatists, the communal violence 
between ethno-religious communities and radical, militant Islamic groups was 
representative of horizontal threats through the threatening of state unity that contained 
an element of criminality.172 With the lack of robust and strong state institutions and 
capacities, this horizontal threat proved far more politically volatile in the democratizing 
years for the government to both manage and cope with. To approach this horizontal 
threat of radical, the state would first further entrench civil control and institutions over 
the means of internal security through two ways. First through setting the conditions 
domestically for the solidification of civil control over CT operations through the 
criminal justice model, and second through external cooperation through ASEAN. These 
state institutions and initial capacities at the domestic and diplomatic levels would prove 
critical to the criminal justice CT approach. This approach treats the act of terrorism as a 
criminal act and brings to bear the might of the criminal justice institutions such as the 
police and legal systems.173 
For Indonesian democracy to thrive and take root, establishing civil control or 
preeminence within state institutions was paramount. This was a gradual process that 
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occurred in part through the determination of which state institution would hold sway 
over internal and external aspects of state security. First the Indonesian military, the 
Angkatan Bersenjata Republik Indonesia (ABRI), while predominately allowed to reform 
itself, was renamed the TNI in a bid for the military to begin the process of distancing 
itself from past human rights violations, direct associations with the Golkar political 
party, abdication of nearly half of its seats in parliament, as well as other aspects of social 
and economic domination and control.174 Second, the domestic, national and local police 
elements were broken away from control under the TNI as a separate entity, the POLRI, 
and placed under the direct control of the civilian government—presidential control—and 
tasked only with the maintenance of internal security. While appearing as noninvasive 
measures, both actions reduced the power of the military through a more narrowly 
defined role, from being one encompassing political, economic, and security spheres to 
that of one more singularly oriented on national defense.175 
Internationally and diplomatically, Indonesia took measures such as the 
strengthening of multilateral agreements via ASEAN and initial dialogue, aid 
arrangements, and tempered support of the U.S. GWOT. While the ASEAN agreements 
did not achieve anything of tangible substance in and of themselves, they did set the 
precedent of these formerly uncooperative and often hostile states to concede to the 
requirement of multilateral cooperation in the realm of combating transnational terrorism. 
These actions would later prove to be critical, foundational elements in implementing an 
effective and comprehensive counter-terrorism strategy equipped with both “hard” and 
“soft” approaches due to the long reaching tentacles of the JI and AQ networks. 
D. CONCLUSION 
Despite these foundational advances, this timeframe should be viewed as one of 
CT ineffectiveness as the Indonesian government treated incidents that did not target the 
                                                 
174 Mietzner, Military Politics, 202–03. 
175 Carnegie, “Militant Islamism”; Pujo Wahyono, Transnational Crime and Security Threats in 
Indonesia, (Carlisle Barracks, PA: U.S. Army War College, 2010), 13; Feillard and Madinier, End of 
Innocence, 159. 
 42
government as normal criminal behavior that did not present a national security threat.176 
This view only reinforced the government’s belief that the country did not face a 
“terrorist problem” requiring concerted CT actions.177 Thus the limited existing state 
capacity and resources could be devoted to dealing with the threats of separatist and 
communal conflicts. The complicated nature of Indonesian radical Islam (the 
interconnectedness of radical Islamic groups, laskars, and transnational actors), the 
attacks of 9/11, and the subsequent U.S. pressure for Indonesia to do more (by identifying 
domestic radical Islamic groups as terrorists and assisting U.S. GWOT efforts) still did 
not cause great alarm. Instead these were viewed with general skepticism by both 
Indonesian authorities and the public at large.178 This view was reflected in Indonesia’s 
upfront but cautious support to U.S. GWOT initiatives.179 This timeframe ended with the 
conclusion of the vigilante and interreligious communal violence that had spread 
throughout much of Indonesia thereby freeing Indonesian government assets and 
capabilities that would prove vital in responding to the coming surge of jihadist 
attacks.180 While born in the timeframe of 1998–2001, the criminal justice CT approach 
would be codified and professionalized further in the wake of the Bali-I attack and the 
subsequent wave of terrorist attacks that ravaged the archipelago from 2002–2008. 
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III. 2002–2008: TRANSNATIONAL TERRORISM ASCENDS 
TO THE FORE 
A. THREAT OVERVIEW 
The timeframe of 2002 through 2008 would be critical for the Indonesian 
government as it would bear witness to major changes and shifts within Indonesian social 
and political spheres in their efforts to combat the emergent threat posed by domestic 
radical Islamic jihadists and transnational terrorism. These changes in society—stemming 
from a shift in public sentiment against radical Islamic jihadists and transnational 
terrorism—and government abilities—the subsequent increased state capacity and 
entrenchment of the criminal justice counterterrorism approach—were a direct result of 
jihadist terrorist attacks. This threat to Indonesia during this timeframe manifested 
through the deadly waves of bombings that would sweep the country, killing and 
wounding foreign tourists and, more often than not, innocent civilian Muslims. 
While other threats such as the separatist movements in Aceh and West Papua and 
the communal, vigilante violence in Sulawesi, Kalimantan, and the Maluccas would 
persist into and peter out early on during this timeframe, the nature of the threat posed by 
the domestic radical and transnational jihadists demonstrated the urgent need for civil 
state capacity to effectively combat and mitigate their effects. For the first time the 
government would admit and confront the fact that if jihadist transnational terrorist 
influences on domestic radical Islamic groups was to be left unchecked, it would pose a 
clear and deadly threat to foreign interests, the Indonesian government, and the lives of 
its citizens.181 The cumulative effect these variables—shifting public sentiment, 
increased state abilities, and capacity (law enforcement and judiciary)—imparted within 
this timeframe was the entrenchment of the criminal justice CT approach and the 
resulting degradation of the jihadists’ capabilities and effectiveness.182 This further led to 
the terrorists responding in kind through evolutions in their means and ways coupled with 
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their subsequent fracturing into disparate subgroups. This fracturing, however, would 
further enable the jihadist movements to endure through the pressures of the state and 
continue to persist as a festering threat into the future as in times past. 
1. The Bombings and Transnational Jihadist Influences 
The deadly string of bombings and terrorist attacks attributed to Jemaah 
Islamiyah (JI) and al-Qaeda (AQ) were associated first with the Bali bombing on Kuta 
beach October 12, 2002, Bali-I, that killed over 200 and wounded over 300 more.183 This 
attack and those that followed would stand out among the myriad of Indonesian terrorist 
attacks and threats of this timeframe due to two primary factors. First, the attacks clearly 
demonstrated the impact and lethality transnational jihadist influences had upon domestic 
jihadist actors within Indonesia. Second, the bombing attacks galvanized the supporting 
or impartial sentiments of two key elements within Indonesian society against the radical 
jihadists’ means and ways: the Indonesian public and civic supporting laskars such as 
Laskar Jihad (LJ) and Islamic Defender’s Front (FPI).184 
In the weeks and months following the bombing, the existence of JI and AQ 
influences coupled with the realization of the extent of JI’s reach throughout Southeast 
Asia—long suspected and declared by Singaporean and U.S. government officials—was 
uncovered and formally acknowledged by Indonesia whose national police had tracked 
down the assailants in concert with U.S. and Australian law enforcement agency 
support.185 Bali-I would quickly be followed by the execution of a string of subsequent 
bombings on targets consisting of the J. Marriott Hotel (2003), the Australian Embassy 
(2004), and Bali-II (2005) by JI and AQ and their affiliates.186 
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The discovery of the linkages between AQ and JI through the investigations that 
followed these bombings led to a debate as to what the full extent of the relationship and 
influences between AQ and JI amounted to. Since early 2005, Jones, later backed by 
Gross and Barton, adamantly declared that the relationship was more on the surface than 
containing any true depth of influence or containing any lasting longevity and that the 
transnational nature was developed by and for domestic, regional purposes alone.187 
Other analysts from Barton to Abuza advocated the idea that it was at AQ’s prodding and 
influences that served as the critical causal factor for both the breakaway from DI and the 
establishment of JI’s structure, overarching ideology, and source of funding.188 Burke 
advocated a third, hybrid theory based on the ties of the Bali-I bombers and others that 
encapsulated not direct AQ influences per se, but AQ methodology similar to those 
advocated for by Abu Musab al-Suri—an AQ affiliate who espoused the molding of AQ 
methodologies with local conditions and atmospherics by domestic jihadists to 
accommodate a more comprehensive and holistic movement—and the associated training 
received by returning foreign fighters from Afghan training camps of the 1980s and early 
‘90s within South Asia that held direct Saudi Arabian ties.189 
The main points from these theories of influence and networking, whether direct 
or indirect, consist not only of the complicated nature of pin-pointing the transnational 
terrorist ties with domestic actors, but includes the highly lethal impact such influences 
may impart on the subsequent domestic initiated attacks. The lethality or effectiveness 
may stem from an infusion of the transnational terrorists and or the returning indigenous 
jihadist veterans who exert influences on the target selection, planning, and execution of 
operations either alongside or by the domestic radical jihadist groups alone. Hegghammer 
captured this phenomenon in 2013 while studying the driving factors for participation by 
jihadists from non-Muslim western states. His data sets showed that, “The presence of a 
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veteran increases—by a factor around 1.5—the probability that a plot will come to 
execution, and it doubles the likelihood that the plot will kill people.”190 
The Indonesian case demonstrates well the application of Hegghammer’s findings 
regarding the impact of returning foreign fighter and veteran influences on demonstrated 
lethality rates (the average rate of those killed and wounded per attack) when examining 
the attacks experienced during the timeframe of 2002–2008. This is achieved by 
reviewing the associated terrorist actors seen in Figure 3 and the comparison of the 
lethality rates in Figure 4. Here AQ’s direct influences and assistance such as funding 
was associated with one of the most lethal attacks experienced by Indonesia to date, Bali-
I, as this single attack demonstrated a lethality rate of 502.191 Bali-I aside, further holistic 
analysis of JI’s remaining attacks during this time period reveals a lethality rate of 65.5 
per attack, an already alarmingly high lethality rate in its own right. When combining JI 
and JI in concert with AQ attacks an aggregate lethality rate of 101.8 casualties per attack 
is demonstrated, an increase of 36.3 casualties per attack.192 Further evidence may be 
seen through the Islamic laskars (Aliansi Gerakan Anti Pemurtadan [AGAP], FPI, and 
LJ) who possessed direct or loose network ties to JI, contained cross memberships, or 
possessed transnational jihadists within their ranks.193 Despite the small number of 
attacks conducted, these groups generally achieved rather high individual lethality rates 
(LJ 10, Mujahedeen Ambon [MA] 10, FPI 2, AGAP1) and a high combined lethality rate 
of 5.8 casualties per attack.194 Furthermore, the lethality rate results for JI and to a lesser 
extent the Islamic radical laskars surpass those achieved by other domestic groups 
employing terrorism without external transnational influences. These groups, though 
accounting for the conduct of more attacks per Figure 3 (Unknown 60%, GAM 19%, and 
OPM 4%), generally inflicted both lower individual lethality rates (Unknown 4.2, GAM 
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3.4, and OPM 5.4) and a lower combined average lethality rate of 3.3 casualties per 
terrorist attack as seen in Figure 4.195 
 
Figure 3.  Terrorist Attacks by Group, 2002–2008. 
 
Figure 4.  Average Lethality Rate per Terrorist Attack, 2002–2008. 
                                                 


























2. Turning the Tide: A Shift in Public Sentiment 
The U.S.-led NATO bombing and invasion of Afghanistan in 2001 and the 
invasion of Iraq in 2003 did much to sway Indonesians against supporting GWOT efforts 
and further buttressed the oft espoused idea of a seemingly “War against Islam” by the 
west.196 By early 2003, these sentiments were reflected in a Pew Global Attitudes 
survey—the Pew Research Center is a nonpartisan American think tank based in 
Washington, D.C. surveying the attitudes of adult (18 and older) Muslim and non-
Muslim state populations—that saw an increase from 33% of Indonesians polled in 2002 
to 59% of those polled again by Pew who felt Islam itself was threatened.197 Sebastian 
captured the Indonesian publics’ sentiments of endorsement for jihadist acts—citing a 
national opinion poll taken by the Centre for Study of Islam and Society (PPM) based in 
Jakarta in 2001 and ‘02 that was analyzed by Liddle—that stated: 
46% in 2001 and 54% in 2002 agreed, “That the ideals and struggle of 
Islamic movements and organizations (like Islamic Defenders Front, 
Laskar Jihad, Darul Islam, and others) to implement syariat in the 
government and society must be supported.198 
Despite holding these beliefs in the context of Islam in relation to these and other world 
events, by the end of the wave of domestic bombings in 2005 Indonesian views regarding 
support for the use of violent terrorist means and ways had shifted profoundly. Prior to 
the conduct of Bali-I in October, in the summer of 2002 Pew polling found that of those 
asked 27% “often” or “sometimes,” 16% “rarely,” and 54% “never” felt it was justifiable 
in striking civilian targets through suicide bombings and violent means.199 With the 
exposure of JI following Bali-I, JI would ardently claim its desire to target the “far 
enemy” consisting of western institutions or symbols and foreign tourists as well as “near 
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enemy” targets such as local Catholics. With the capture and trial of the Bali-I chief JI 
commander Imam Sumadra, this justification was reiterated publically within Sumadra’s 
deposition as he stated that the target represented, “The gathering place of international 
terrorists—that is, Israelis/Jews, Americans, Australia, and other countries involved in the 
destruction of Afghanistan during Ramadhan 2001.”200 Yet the Indonesian public 
experienced and bore witness to the mounting evidence to the contrary with bombing 
after bombing resulting in high numbers of innocent Indonesian Muslim casualties.201 
Subsequently in a Pew 2005 survey following the last attack, Indonesian public sentiment 
shifted further away from support of terrorist acts with 15% stating that it was “often” or 
“sometimes,” 18% “rarely,” and 66% “never” justified to target civilians.202 These public 
sentiments resonated further during this timeframe as captured by Oak in two 2006 
polls—taken by the private Indonesian surveying company Lembaga Survei Indonesia 
(LSI) and translated by Taylor Fincher—that reflected 78% of those polled who believed 
the death penalty for the main Bali-I bombers was a just ruling and a further 80.7% who 
did not believe in the act of violent jihad.203 
For the civic-minded laskars such as LJ and FPI, the killing of innocent, fellow 
Muslims and the perceived targeting of the Indonesian state was beyond the scope and 
intent of their aims and represented a “bridge too far.” Internal fracturing within LJ soon 
appeared and in the immediate days following Bali-I, LJ’s leader Jafar Umar Thalib—in 
addition to FPI’s Habib Rizieq Shihab during the same timeframe—declared the 
cessation of operations throughout the archipelago and both group’s disbanding.204 
Questions remained as to the true extent of the wider LJ membership’s support of the 
leadership’s decisions as only 300 or so jihadists out of the supposed thousands that were 
mobilized and deployed had returned to their points of origin.205 Despite these remaining 
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concerns, these shifts in public sentiment and distancing by fellow jihadists turned the 
tide within the political sphere and would have profound repercussions for the domestic-
transnational jihadists while simultaneously opening the door to the Indonesian 
government to seize the initiative. 
3. Jihadist Internal Discords, Group Evolutions, and New Threats 
International pressures stemming from the high number of foreign tourists killed, 
the growing loss of public and laskar support, and increasing state abilities and capacities 
to combat the jihadist threat were factors that played a part in JI conducting an internal 
evaluation and making structural and operational adjustments. This led to the sudden 
fracturing among JI members as to the means and ways of continuing the fight and the re-
structuring of the movement as a whole. These differences in opinions and objectives or 
what Shapiro coined as “preference divergence,” hinged around those who advocated 
targeting the “near enemy”—defined as government or civil entities that were allied to or 
in agreement with western ways—focusing direct action efforts on elements of the 
Indonesian government, and those who advocated targeting of the “far enemy”—defined 
as western governments and their civilians—focusing direct action efforts on western 
civilians, governments, and symbols of globalization both on Indonesian soil and 
abroad.206 Compounding this further were the divergent beliefs on the use of violent 
means to achieve desired end-states, the specific types of violent means to be utilized—
targeted assassinations or bombing campaigns—and the timing of implementation.207 
Following Bali-I, many JI radicals led by Ba’asyir denounced the bombings and 
their high loss of innocent Muslim lives as counterproductive to gaining the crucially 
needed public support. Thus, Ba’asyir shifted toward advocating for the means and ways 
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to refocus and transform the organization around non-violence.208 In 2005, following the 
last of the series of bombings from 2002–04, Ba’asyir was quoted as saying: 
They all had good intention, that is, Jihad in Allah’s way, the aim of the 
jihad is to look for blessing from Allah. They are right that America is the 
proper target because America fights Islam. So in terms of their 
objectives, they are right, and the target of their attacks was right also. But 
their calculations are debatable. My view is that we should do bombings in 
conflict areas not in peaceful areas. We have to target the  place of the 
enemy, not countries where many Muslims live.209 
One of the first hardline groups who advocated for the continued use of violent means 
through bombing campaigns against “near enemy” and “far enemy” targets was led by 
Hambali, Azahari, and Noordin Top. Following Bali-I, Top—also known as Anshar el-
Muslimin and Thoifah Muqotilah by his associates—would form al-Qaeda for the Malay 
Archipelago or Tanzim Qaedat al-Jihad.210 A self-radicalized jihadist who ardently 
translated AQ’s magazine articles, Top adapted the AQ ideology in concert with local 
conditions along the lines and ideas professed by al-Suri, and saw himself as the means to 
continuing the militant legacy of JI.211 To further grow and support his new faction, Top 
reached out to JI mid-level leader Sarwo Edi Nughroho. Top requested various resources 
consisting of funding, explosives, and jihadists to carry out his plans. Nugroho flatly 
rebuffed Top, stating that: 
Because we have different chains of command, in addition to which our 
vision, mission, and selection of targets is different…You don’t have to 
use bombs everywhere but by kidnapping or shooting, or using other 
methods, you are likely to hit the right target.212 
Through AQA, the reign of bombing attacks on the “far enemy” located on Indonesian 
soil would continue.213 Top’s group was later linked and implicated in the subsequent 
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bombings of the Marriott Hotel 2003, Australian Embassy 2004, Bali-II 2005, and 
Jakarta 2009, though JI would continue to be suspected as the culprits by the 
authorities.214 To orchestrate his wave of bombings Top broke the traditional operational 
mold—terrorist attacks by groups acting alone—by astutely corralling a variety of 
loosely aligned networks of radical jihadist groups and members from JI elements—JI in 
Sumatra for the ‘03 attack and the East Java division, Central Java JI alumni, the revived 
Dar-ul Islam faction, and Ring Banten for the ‘04 attack.215 His faction would continue to 
pursue its violent campaign, posing a continued threat and vexing both the JI 
establishment and Indonesian authorities into the next timeframe of 2009–present.216 
Finally from 2005 to 2008 JI under went further organizational and ideological 
changes with its abdication from the use of violence due to a belief that the timing was 
bad; Indonesians were simply not ready for an armed uprising in the present. Instead 
Ba’asyir formed Jamaah Ansharud Tauhid (JAT), Partisans of the Oneness of God, in 
September of 2008 and devoted itself to re-building the ranks and conduct the groups re-
structuring through religious—dakwah—and educational—tarbiyah—outreach.217 As 
stated by Gordon and Lindo, the denunciation of the use of violence into the present by JI 
was not one denouncing the overall use of violence as a legitimate tactic; violence and 
jihad was and still is advocated by JI/JAT to be used in the future or another location 
given the right societal and political conditions.218 Furthermore, through its functions of 
dakwah and tarbiyah, JI/JAT advocated less for the establishment of a regional caliphate 
pursued by the decentralized administratively separate regional Mantiqis, but would 
espouse the goal of establishing the DI-rooted, Islamic State of Indonesia through a more 
centralized administrative and leadership model. This construct would consist of three 
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divisions with the first focused on eastern Indonesia, the second emanating from Poso, 
Central Sulawesi, and the third covering western Indonesia.219 Beyond the regional 
divisions, JAT further incorporated structure down to the district and even small cell 
levels. Operationally, some JAT cells would exist in the covert, militant realm while the 
organization as a whole would exist more in the main public eye and work toward 
tightening networks and relationships with the remaining radical Islamic militias and 
vigilante groups.220 
B. THE STATE RESPONSE 
The Indonesian government did not completely adjust course leading up to the 
attack of Bali-I as it initially continued to maintain its rather indirect, tempered response 
in dealing with the radical Islamic groups and jihadists. Resonating within the Megawati 
government during this timeframe were fears of political backlash and sensitivities 
associated with confronting the radical Islamists and overall lack of wanting to be seen as 
U.S. “lackeys” stemming from any provided GWOT support.221 Yet the declaration that 
the attack of Bali-I was due in part to those with direct links to AQ enabled the 
government to admit it had a real terrorist problem, a problem it could now garner 
support for and allocate resources against in response.222 
With international attention focused on the high number of foreign tourists killed 
and wounded coupled with the discovery of a domestic transnational organization, JI, 
linked closely with AQ designated as the principle suspects, the criminal nature of the act 
and calls for bringing them to justice took center stage. Subsequently, overtures and 
attempts at trying to determine the full extent of the ideological justifications and 
grievances were subordinated.223 These factors caused the Megawati administration to 
empower the established criminal justice institutions to handle the state response.224 This 
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action would unknowingly and indirectly further entrench the criminal justice CT 
approach toward combating the mobilization and actions of the transnational and 
domestic jihadists. This facilitation of state institutional empowerment was followed in 
kind by three actions: first, the building of “hard” CT capacity through the creation, 
professionalization, and actions of law enforcement institutions and agencies; second, the 
subsequent convictions and sentencing through newly enacted CT legislation; and third, 
the eventual directed targeting of the ideology by the government through the initiation of 
the “soft” CT measures of de-radicalization and disengagement programs.225 Thus, these 
actions coupled with the turning of public sentiment against the jihadists and the receipt 
of backing by mainstream-moderate Muslim groups NU and Muhammadiyah provided 
the Indonesian government the “ability” it previously lacked to effectively engage the 
jihadists.226 
1. CT Capacity: Creation and Professionalization of CT Law 
Enforcement 
As the Megawati administration, later the Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono (SBY) 
administration, and the governmental institutions gained the ability to act, the acquiring 
of CT capacity and achieving effectiveness presented the next hurdle to actively counter 
and effectively combat the mobilization and effectiveness of the radical domestic and 
transnational jihadist terrorists.227 Through the creation of CT institutions and special 
units coupled with the professionalization of those entities and the POLRI, the national 
police, this capacity and capability was achieved; actions that further entrenched the 
criminal justice CT approach. First we must understand both what CT institutional 
changes were initially implemented and the process and source by which further 
developments and professionalization would manifest. This process would be witnessed 
through the interplay of the newly created state institutions and the sources of assistance 
provided by the international community, specifically the U.S. and Australia. Second, the 
law enforcement’s actions taken during and following this professionalization process 
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against the jihadists will be described through its employment of “hard” CT measures 
with the conduct of arrests or killing of JI leadership. 
Despite a seemingly tempered and offhand approach by the Megawati 
administration in outward rhetoric, the administration began to take decisive actions 
through the institution of emergency acts and the high level of empowerment granted to 
the POLRI and the national intelligence agency, the Badan Intelijen Negara (BIN).228 
Through Instruction 4/2002 Megawati placed under the control of the Coordinating 
Minister of Political and Security Affairs the newly formed Desk for Coordination of 
Eradicating Terrorism (DCET) with the directive of creating and instituting an 
overarching CT policy. Under Instruction 4/2002 and 5/2002, the head of the BIN was 
directed to lead and align all efforts of the state’s intelligence agencies and communities 
such as the POLRI, the security agency, and the TNI Strategic Agency.229 Chief among 
the CT agency creations that year that was established from, “Disciplined and honest 
officers who are exceptionally well paid by Indonesian standards,” was that of the 
POLRI’s elite CT unit, Densus-88.230 This unit would be at the forefront of Indonesia’s 
civil based, criminal justice CT approach and employment of “hard” CT measures; 
actions that were much to the TNI’s discontent and further detriment to TNI and POLRI 
relations.231 By 2004, Densus-88 was expanded to include regional, provincial level 
teams to further augment local level POLRI elements.232 In the wake of the 2004 
Australian Embassy bombing, the Antiterrorism Task Force (ATF) was placed under the 
BIN with the mandate of tracking down terrorists throughout the archipelago and further 
coordinating and instilling a unity of effort among the TNI’s special operations units and 
POLRI CT units such as Densus-88. To further instill a “whole of government” approach 
and “unity of effort” among the disparate ministries—the Ministries of Justice, Finance, 
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Foreign Affairs, and Attorney General’s Office among others—were each represented 
within the ATF and expected to cooperate.233 
Knowing that the planned attacks, those to come, and the survival of JI required 
sources of funding, Indonesian authorities quickly turned to staunching the flow of 
capital to jihadist groups by creating institutional capacities specifically tailored for those 
pursuits. To this end, beginning in 2002 new legislation would be drafted with the newly 
created Pusat Pelaporan dan Analisis Transaksi Keuangan (PPTAK)—Indonesian 
Financial Transaction Reports and Analysis Center (INTRAC) tasked specifically with 
the monitoring and enforcing the anti-money laundering and counter-financing terrorism 
regulations.234 In further concert with the PPTAK, the Bank Negara Indonesia (BNI) was 
tasked with additional monitoring and adherence to those regulations. Despite these 
institutions, the enforcement and achievement of set goals and desired end-states of 
devised action plans has be fraught with roadblocks, corruption, and the inherently 
difficult nature of establishing connections and the freezing of financial assets.235 
The international attention brought forth from Bali-I, stemming from the 88 
Australian tourists killed of the 202 and others wounded—the namesake of Densus-88 in 
the decease honor—would lead to a high level of law enforcement support to Indonesia. 
All told, ten states would contribute manpower, resources—such as forensics teams and 
trainers from the U.S. CIA, FBI, and USA special-forces—and funding to assist the 
Indonesians in the subsequent bombing investigations and law enforcement 
professionalization that ensued.236 Densus-88 would be of particular importance and be 
on the receiving end of the majority of funding and specialized training through programs 
such as the U.S. State Department’s (SD) Diplomatic Security Initiative.237 Through the 
U.S. Anti-terrorism Assistance program Indonesia received $40 million between 2002–
2007, an amount exceeded only by security contributions given to Afghanistan, 
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Columbia, and Pakistan.238 This aid was further reinforced by Australia contributing $10 
million from 2002–2006 in conjunction with the establishment of the Jakarta Centre for 
Law Enforcement Cooperation (JCLEC) in 2004—with the additional boost of $36.8 
million by Australia in February that year—with the Australian Federal Police (AFP) 
tailoring and conducting joint CT training alongside the POLRI and Densus-88.239 The 
JCLEC’s primary directive is both preparedness and training based, with the overarching 
goal for the provision of, “A range of training and capacity building programs to enhance 
the operational expertise of regional law enforcement personnel for dealing with all forms 
of transnational crime, including terrorism.”240 The creation of CT institutions such as 
the ATF, JCLEC, and elite law enforcement units like Densus-88 further enabled 
intelligence gathering capabilities that were previously lacking in regard to the aspect of 
domestic criminal acts deemed critical components to combating the transnational and 
domestic radical jihadist threat. Yet, due to the controversy and human rights sensitivities 
such institutions and their actions solicit within the public spheres, it would not be until 
2011 that legislation further enabling the BIN to legally acquire intelligence through 
specific measures would be codified.241 
Armed with the newly acquired CT capacity, the Indonesian authorities were 
quick to put them to use in the timeframe following Bali-I through the successful “hard” 
CT actions of Densus-88 targeting JI leadership and key membership. Between 2002 and 
2009, law enforcement authorities would arrest approximately 464 JI operatives and kill 
40, that according to Oak equated to nearly 23% of the JI reported members during the 
groups’ operational peak.242 These high numbers of arrests and subsequent convictions 
would surpass those of other nations facing transnational and domestic jihadist based 
threats during this timeframe.243 While the major gains were unable to prevent the 
execution of the devastating wave of bombing attacks that followed Bali-I and 
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culminated with Bali-II in 2005, each arrest and the intelligence gathered—such as a 
copy of JI’s doctrinal organizational and operating procedures, Pedoman Umum 
Perjuangan Al-Jama’ah (PUPJI), which further listed key leadership figures—led 
authorities to conduct further operations.244 These culminated with JI loosing much of its 
high-level leadership and determined, experienced members, as seen in the Appendix, 
“JI’s Major Leaders and Key Figures,” established through the work of Oak.245 
2. CT Capacity: Antiterrorism Legislation and Chaos in the Courts 
As the Megawati administration relied upon the POLRI to take the lead in the 
fight against the jihadists, it soon became apparent that further steps would have to be 
taken in both the legislative and judiciary realms to combat, try, and convict the jihadist 
bombers of Bali-I and beyond. The discussion over and subsequent fears associated with 
such specified “antiterrorism legislation” harked back to the oppressive, anti-sedition 
styled laws of colonialism and the authoritarian Suharto years, and would spark country 
wide debate for their utility and need by Islamists and human rights activists alike.246 
While the measures instituted would be far less severe than those instituted by other 
Southeast Asian states, they would undergo further contestation and overruling by the 
courts themselves despite the continued bombing campaigns of the jihadists during this 
timeframe.247 
Within weeks of Bali-I, Megawati through emergency decree powers—decrees 
that were later ratified into law under the anti-terrorism bills by Parliament in March of 
2003—pushed through two specific measures, “Regulation In-Lieu of Law No. 1/2002 on 
the Eradication of Terrorist Act,” and, “Regulation In-Lieu of Law No. 2/2002 on the 
Eradication of Criminal Acts of Terrorism in Relation to the Bomb Explosion Incident in 
Bali, 12 October 2002.”248 These laws and the subsequent ones that followed were 
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fundamental in further codifying and entrenching the criminal justice CT approach to 
combat the jihadists. The regulations defined what the state would constitute as acts of 
terror and further asserted that all crimes of terror would be tried within the civil vice 
military courts.249 To the government, terrorism would be specifically defined as, “Any 
violent act that could create terror or insecurity among the public or cause destruction of 
vital facilities.”250 Through these regulations suspects could be held for up to six months 
for questioning and the type of evidence accepted was broadened to include those 
gathered by the intelligence community from wire-taps, electronic media, banking 
records, etc. Furthermore, a conviction could carry with it a minimum sentence of three 
years confinement or a maximum sentence of death.251 
While these regulations served to further detain, question, gather evidence 
pertaining to the cases of those arrested and suspected jihadists of the Bali-I bombing and 
beyond, almost overnight issues of jurisprudence arose and called into question their 
legitimacy. Between 2002 and 2004, many of those Bali-I suspects such as Ba’asysir 
would be tried and sentenced in accordance with the 2003 legislation with three death 
penalties and one life sentence being the most extreme sentences given.252 As captured 
by Means, Article 28 of the Indonesian constitution states, “The right of citizens not to be 
prosecuted retroactively is a basic human right that shall not be diminished under any 
circumstances.”253 On these grounds the legitimacy of the legislation and subsequent 
Bali-I trial rulings would be raised by both activists and Ba’asyir’s lawyers, who would 
appeal to Jakarta’s District Courts and ultimately receive a reduced sentence.254 In 2004, 
the Constitutional Court passed a ruling that overturned the verdicts stemming from the 
use of the anti-terrorism laws for the Bali-I and Marriott bombings citing, “The 
provisions of that law sanctioning retroactive application were unconstitutional and 
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therefore void.”255 This verdict would affect some 27 cases and further complicated the 
judicial process by failing to determine whether those cases were therefore retroactively 
categorized as “mistrials.”256 While muddying the waters of the 2002–2003 timeframe, 
those terrorists arrested and tried for the subsequent wave of bombings in 2004–2005 
were tried from 2006–2007 without issue according to the anti-terrorism laws of 2003.257 
A final form of legislative contention arose from whether to label JI as a terrorist 
organization, which being an illegal and therefore banned organization meant its 
members were subject to the antiterrorism laws and arrest. In the highly Islamist and 
politicized atmosphere of the early 2000s, Indonesia had disregarded earlier labeling of JI 
by the United Nations Security Council Resolution 1267, passed in 1996 that had 
identified JI led by Ba’asyir as a terrorist organization.258 This despite the fact that the 
government had no issue identifying as illegal and prosecuting a myriad of “deviant” 
Muslim and other religious sects and their leadership.259 For the government, part of the 
issue relied upon the general belief that it could not deem an “Islamic community”—the 
literal translation of Jemaah Islamiyah—as a terrorist organization.260 The vice president 
went further, stating: “How can we ban an organization that does not exist? Who is the 
chairman? Who are the members? Where is the headquarters?”261 In addition, security 
agencies themselves could not decide between them which path was best. Here the TNI’s 
Badan Intelijen Strategis (BAIS) believed that it was easier to track and monitor radical 
groups who operated in the open than those who were banned and forced underground. 
Conversely, the POLRI’s Home Security Intelligence Agency (BIK) held the counter 
belief that banning radical groups is precisely the course of action to take with application 
to those political movements whose activities support or espouse the creation for an 
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Islamic State such as Hizb ut-Tahrir Indonesia.262 Yet in April 2008, a South Jakarta 
District Court judge determined JI to be an illegal organization, an action the government 
had tiptoed around until that time.263 With this established precedent, the government 
would later adapt its use when confronting IS and domestic IS supporters. 
3. Overtures at Addressing the Ideology—Deradicalization and 
Disengagement 
As the capacities and abilities of the Indonesian government grew, so too did the 
growing number of incarcerated jihadists within the prisons throughout the archipelago. 
By the end of 2004, the SBY administration acknowledged the need for discourse 
targeting the radical jihadist ideology itself.264 SBY was not alone in holding these 
beliefs with some in government institutions supporting the use of the “soft” CT 
measures of deradicalization and or disengagement—terms vaguely defined with varied 
meanings—as additional means by which to combat the jihadists. At the “grassroots” 
level the belief not only was shared, but also began to grow and manifest into ad-hoc 
measures and actions taken by the POLRI. First the terms will be defined and second, the 
means and ways of implementation will be discussed. 
The term deradicalization in its most basic form implies a transformation of 
beliefs or, as an International Crisis Group report states, “The process of creating an 
environment that discourages the growth of radical movements by addressing the basic 
issues fuelling them.”265 Contrary to deradicalization, disengagement is more behavior 
oriented and simply seeks to lead the jihadist to abandon the use of violence as a means 
to an end and attempts social reintegration.266 These definitions are broad based and open 
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to diverse methodological processes for implementation that vary from state to state. For 
Indonesia, these methodologies appeared to hinge around three means: acts of “kindness” 
by the POLRI toward the jihadists, the distribution of monetary assistance to acquiescing 
jihadists, and talking tours by disengaged jihadists such as Nasir Abas—former JI Deputy 
Head of Mantiqi III—and Ali Imron—the younger brother to one of the Bali-I 
bombers.267 
Through the POLRI, both processes were seen as potentially viable and effective 
“soft” CT measures that could impart short and long-term effects on the reduction of 
those possessing radical Islamic beliefs and the rates of jihadist recidivism.268 Such 
sentiments were captured in an interview with the BBC when General Ansyaad M’Bai 
stated, “We shouldn’t see these radical groups as black and white…In our experience, no 
one could be a terrorist forever.”269 The POLRI’s first spheres for these overtures to 
manifest into direct action occurred in the least likely of all places, through the additional 
measures implemented by Densus-88 under the leadership of Superintendent Tito 
Karnavian and Brigadier General Surya Dharma.270 With many members of the elite CT 
unit being devout Muslims, the agents began to not only treat the jihadists with respect 
and kindness in their dealings and handling of them in accordance with Islamic principles 
while in police care, but conducted daily prayers alongside and conversed with them 
afterward.271 In addition to gaining actionable intelligence, it was hoped that these 
interactions would be viewed by the jihadists as examples running counter to the 
extremist beliefs that all POLRI and Indonesian government officials were murtad—
apostates—or kafir, “infidels in matter of belief,” and that any assistance from them was 
                                                 
267 Kristen E. Schulze, “Indonesia’s Approach to Jihadist Deradicalization,” CTC Sentinel 1, no. 8 
(July 2008); ICG, “‘Deradicalisation,’” 1; Acharya, Whither Southeast Asia, 154; Abuza, “Rehabilitation of 
Jemaah Islamiyah,” 194. 
268 Acharya, Whither Southeast Asia, 153–54. 
269 Abuza, “Rehabilitation of Jemaah Islamiyah,” 193. 
270 Carnegie, “Latent Insurgency,” 130; Abuza, “Rehabilitation of Jemaah Islamiyah,” 199. 
271 Carnegie, “Latent Insurgency,” 130. 
 63
haram, forbidden.272 Thus, these simple acts of kindness and exposure to a counter 
narrative would spark further internal questioning by the jihadists as to other aspects and 
tenants of the radical, extremist ideology.273 In addition, monetary assistance from the 
POLRI to many of the families of jihadists further solidified these openings and 
subsequent successes, though it also becomes the main incentive for many.274 
With the succession of bombing campaigns of 2002–2005, the same sentiments 
about the killing of fellow Muslims that caused rifts within the JI organization led to the 
disengagement of some jihadists within the holding cells of the regional POLRI units and 
state prison system alike. Those disengaged jihadists such as Abas, who were held in high 
regard within jihadi circles, were allowed to write and publish disengagement oriented 
works in prison and were further utilized on speaking tours to other Indonesian prisons to 
further disengage other jihadists recently arrested before they were interrogated.275 
Karnavian was quoted as saying that, “When their Islamic argument is already defeated, 
then it is easy for us. Then we enter.”276 By 2007, the Indonesian Parliament 
acknowledged the work of the POLRI and announced the backing of the deradicalization 
and disengagement programs, yet allotted funding to combat root causes of radicalization 
such as poverty alleviation leaving the POLRI to continue its work in an underfunded ad-
hoc manner.277 
C. ASSESSMENT 
The timeframe of 2002–2008 began with the state still lacking the ability and 
subsequent capacity to effectively respond to the pressures and threat posed by Islamic 
radical jihadists. JI and AQA failed to capitalize on the government’s initial weaknesses 
in ability and capacity to effectively respond leading up to Bali-I and further failed to 
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anticipate the subsequent negative impact the deaths of innocent fellow Muslims would 
solicit from the Indonesian public during the years 2002–2005. In this manner, JI and 
AQA’s continued violent actions only had the effect of strengthening as opposed to 
weakening the state.278 Yet the resiliency of the jihadist groups to conduct organizational 
and ideological evolutions in the face of these failures was demonstrated with the group 
and radical jihadist movement continuing its existence well into the future.279 
As the bombing campaigns continued the state’s abilities to respond through civil 
CT capacities and response grew exponentially between the years 2002–2005. This was 
seen first with the implementation of criminal justice CT agencies, units, judicial 
legislation, and the decisive use of “hard” CT measures through arrests and incarcerations 
of jihadist leadership and key members; and second through the early implementation of 
“soft” measures such as deradicalization and disengagement programs and processes. The 
state was not only able to create and achieve CT capacity, but in the manner of doing so 
through the incorporation of both “hard” and “soft” CT measures it had instituted a 
comprehensive and effective criminal justice CT model by the timeframe’s end.280 This 
approach would be one that not only incorporated elements to combat the jihadist actions, 
but also began the means by which to further address the mobilization of individuals into 
radical jihadist groups. 
1. “Hard” CT Measures 
The effectiveness of the Indonesian criminal justice CT approach through the 
creation of CT agencies and the use of “hard” measures was achieved through a 
combination of sound law enforcement and judiciary processing and incarceration of 
jihadists. JI and AQA would come to feel the full weight of this effectiveness with great 
losses in key leaders and members at the hands of the newly created and professionalized 
ATF, Densus-88, POLRI, and other state entities. This was evident with the capture or the 
death of leaders such as Ba’asyir (arrested October 2002 and served only 26 of a 36 
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month jail sentence), Abu Rusdan (arrested April 23, 2003), Hambali (arrested August 
2003), Amrozi and Mukhlas bin Nurahsyim (arrested and sentenced to death November 
2002), Imam Samudra (arrested and sentenced to death November 2002), Zarkasih 
(arrested June 2007), Abu Dujana (arrested June 2007) and many more (see the 
Appendix).281 The loss of such leadership and experience, according to Byman is 
catastrophic for a terrorist organization and its operational capacity: 
Generators of terror such as bomb makers, trainers, document forgers, 
recruiters, and leaders are both scarce in number and require many months 
if not years to perfect their skills. If these generators of terror can be 
eliminated through arrests, killings, the organization as a whole is 
disrupted. The movement may still have many willing recruits, but it is no 
longer effective.282 
Without the “hard” CT measures, antiterrorism bill legislation of 2003, and the judiciary 
conviction efforts by the state, it is reasonable to infer that the amount of attacks and 
those killed and wounded would have potentially been higher and resulted in many more 
lives lost and damages sustained to property. Such a claim may be made given the 
jihadists’ high lethality rate and propensity for action as seen in Figures 3 and 4.283The 
impact of these arrests and the neutralization or convictions of core leaders and members 
can not be overstated and is seen when placing the convicted terrorist convictions of 
Figure 5 against the jihadist lethality rates in Figure 6.284 Under this context, the steady 
drop in the jihadist lethality rate in the years following Bali-I may be correlated with and 
attributed to the loss of jihadist group leadership and core members. Despite Top’s 
attempts at cobbling together coalitions of disparate and loosely aligned jihadists who 
desired to continue the struggle through violent means, he was simply unable to achieve 
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the high lethality rates of years past as seen with the 2008 lethality rate dropping to 
26.5.285 
 
Figure 5.  Convicted Terrorists in Indonesia, 2000–2012. 
 
Figure 6.  Jihadist Lethality Rates, 2002–2008. 
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2. “Soft” CT Measures 
While initiated and funded through “grass-roots” methodologies, the 
incorporation of “soft” CT measures through deradicalization and disengagement 
programs by the very organization conducting the ‘hard’ CT actions, the POLRI and 
Densus-88, can be seen as attempts at furthering the criminal justice CT approach toward 
a comprehensive CT strategy.286 The effectiveness of these programs was limited and 
difficult to assess due to the small number of participants and ad-hoc nature of the 
methodologies. Of the hundreds of jihadists incarcerated early on during this timeframe 
only 10–20 decided to disengage and opt to further work with the POLRI.287 By 2007, an 
additional 20 family members and jihadists, incentivized by monetary assistance, directly 
participated in disengagement counseling of the 400 potential candidates asked.288 Yet 
the jihadist cooperation and intelligence gathered during interrogations (following 
attempts at disengagement reported by the POLRI and Densus-88) was a variable that 
further enabled the POLRI to conduct raids and arrests; actions that ultimately 
contributed to bringing about jihadist operational ineffectiveness.289 The deradicalization 
and disengagement strategy, while in its infancy during this timeframe, set the foundation 
from which further developments could later be implemented and processes explored 
such as further incorporation of civil society’s moderate Muslim groups, NU and 
Mohammidiyah, as well as the more hardline MUI that would be incorporated in the 
timeframe of 2009–present.290 
3. Shortfalls of Indonesia’s Criminal Justice CT Approach 
Despite the gains made through capacity and enhanced CT efforts, this timeframe 
was still marked by a failure of the government to label radical Islamic groups such as JI 
as terrorists until the landmark decision by the Jakarta District Court in 2008; a precedent 
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later to be utilized in confronting IS.291 The persistence of such a failure was due in part 
to the lingering political sensitivities surrounding political Islam and the initial political 
clout many radical Islamic groups possessed. This was further compounded by a 
lingering fear by government officials of residual public sentiment holding the belief that 
the state’s CT actions were a part of the U.S. GWOT.292 
Furthermore, this timeframe underlined some shortcomings of the Indonesian 
criminal justice CT approach through identified issues within the judicial and prison 
systems. This is demonstrated within the justice system where the incorporation of 
convicted jihadists to participate within amnesty programs, such as the annual 
Independence Day amnesty that was designed to reduce normal criminal behavior, has 
meant less time in prison due to ‘good behavior’ and the potential for increased jihadist 
recidivism upon release. Abuza cited that 12 of the 33 Bali-I bombers as well as 10 of 
those charged with aiding and executing Bali-II would receive reduced sentences under 
such programs.293 Additionally, the means and ways for jihadist activities and recidivism 
to continue both in and outside of prison were enabled by the prison system itself. Here 
jihadist prisoners were mixed with general population criminals and were afforded much 
leeway with the means to communicate with the outside world via phones and 
computers.294 These issues cumulatively allowed the jihadist ideology and the groups to 
persist and pursue more recruits.295 In an interview in jail with CNN in 2007, Abu 
Dujana stated, “It [JI] will continue to exist and continue to move on with its plans.”296 
D. CONCLUSION 
The enabling key element to the state’s abilities to first build CT capacity and 
second to take direct action against the jihadists came in the wake of the sequence of 
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bombings starting with Bali-I in 2002 to Bali-II in 2005 when public sentiment greatly 
turned against the terrorists. This turn of opinion subsequently gave the Indonesian 
authorities the political and societal “go ahead” to further initiate “hard” CT efforts.  
These efforts consisted of enhancing and professionalizing the state’s law enforcement 
agencies—in conjunction with resources and monetary aid from the U.S. and Australia—
and the passing of appropriate judicial legislation and actions.  
The cumulative effect of these variables—shifting public sentiment, increased 
state capabilities, and professionalized capacity—were entrenched and codified in a 
“hard” criminal justice approach to combating the mobilization and violent actions of the 
jihadists. The “backbone” of this CT program and its demonstrated effectiveness—seen 
in the degraded capabilities and operational effectiveness of the jihadists—stemmed 
directly from the government’s reliance on the “hard” approach and its limited 
employment of “soft” (“grassroots” disengagement and deradicalization efforts) CT 
measures whose effectiveness was difficult to gauge at best.297  
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IV. 2009-PRESENT: JIHADIST RESILIENCY 
AND THE ISLAMIC STATE 
A. THREAT OVERVIEW 
Echoing back to the timeframe of 1998–2001, this time period of 2009 to 2016 
encompasses similar internal and external entities posing both vertical and horizontal 
threats toward Indonesian integrity, national security, and unity. As before, vertical 
threats consist of the continued OPM separatist movement in West Papua threatening 
national integrity as well as the direct influences and supported attacks by jihadist 
transnational terrorists and their affiliated domestic Islamic radical groups. In addition, 
communal and religious intolerance–based violence is appearing yet again as a growing 
horizontal threat through many new and old regions of the country posing a threat to 
national unity—graphically depicted below in Figure 7: Indonesian Separatist, 
Communal, and Jihadist Violence, 1965–2016.298 The focus here will be on the threat 
posed by domestic radical and transnational jihadist groups. 
Two themes may be seen within the single threat posed by jihadist transnational 
terrorism within this timeframe. First, domestic radical jihadist groups would persist with 
violent acts of terror into and throughout much of this timeframe from 2009–2016, seen 
through Noordin Top’s al-Qaeda for the Malay Archipelago (AQA) and Santoso’s 
Mujahidin Indonesia Timur (MIT). Second, the rise of civil wars in Syria and Iraq 
between 2011–13 and appearance of transnationally linked jihadist factions—AQ’s al-
Nusra Front (ANF) and the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) that was quickly 
followed by the Islamic State (IS) by 2014—would see the rejuvenation of transnational 
terrorist group influences throughout many parts of the world. Regarding Indonesia, the 
IS would expand its global strategies to further network, incorporate into their global 
designs, and evolve the active domestic jihadist groups.299 
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Along these two themes, this timeframe may further be divided into two distinct 
parts with varying means, ways, and nature of the overall threat the jihadists pose to the 
state. The first would begin with the actions and resiliency of domestic radical groups 
such as JI, JAT, Top’s AQA, lintas Tanzim, and later MIT led by Santoso, who 
conducted what Jones and IPAC dubbed, “Low-tech and low-casualty,”—in comparison 
to years past—revenge based attacks on the POLRI and government symbols from 2009 
through 2012 and beyond.300 The second timeframe from 2013 to the present day would 
see further jihadist rejuvenation through the impact and influences of the Syrian civil war 
and the IS culminating with the conduct of the first IS supported domestic jihadist attack 
in Jakarta on January 14, 2016.301 
1. Domestic Jihadists and the Rise of ISIS/IS–2009–2012 
By 2009 much of the JI network was dismantled within Indonesia and across 
Southeast Asia. For Indonesia, this was achieved through the state’s effective 
implementation of the criminal justice CT approach coupled with the significant loss of 
public support toward the jihadists’ actions, which together played a key role in the 
group’s move toward adopting the non-violent path.302 This however, would not be the 
end for those JI members and other jihadist splinter groups still bent on conducting 
further bombings and continuing the struggle by violent means. These groups would 
continue threatening the “near enemy” of the Indonesian government as well as that of 
the “far enemy” of foreign interests and targets.303 
In the wake of the 2005 Bali-II bombing by AQA and the subsequent arrest of 
many of its associates and actors by the POLRI and Densus-88, Top’s group—with close 
associate Dulmatin—were on the run from authorities and remained relatively quiet as  
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they attempted to re-outfit, regroup, and plan the next phase of operations from 2005–
08.304 This “rest and refit” time-period is captured in Figure 6, demonstrated by the 
group’s inactivity following the attack in 2005 until its reemergence with attacks in 
2008.305 In July of 2009, a complex attack consisting of two separate suicide bombings 
on the Marriot and Ritz Carlton hotels in the center of Jakarta’s business district resulting 
in the deaths of 9 and over 50 wounded, rocked the country out of its “jihadless” 
slumber.306 Authorities quickly learned that Top had once again orchestrated, planned, 
and executed the attacks with former JI members and disparate elements of jihadist 
splinter groups spread across the archipelago.307 In June of that year, Top’s second major 
planned operation failed when his plot to assassinate SBY was uncovered and foiled by 
the POLRI and Densus-88. With the authorities now in hot pursuit and during the conduct 
of numerous raids, the leaders of AQA would be killed in shoot-outs with the POLRI and 
Densus-88 that resulted in TOP being killed in September 2009 and Dulmatin in March 
2010.308 
Prior to his death in 2010, Dulmatin had followed Top’s lead and organized 
multiple radical jihadist groups such as elements of JI, JAT, FPI, Ring Banten, and 
Komite Aksi Penanggulangan Akibat Krisis (KOMPAK) who were disenfranchised with 
both JI and AQA’s lackluster leadership, organizational structures, and objectives. With 
apparent funding and other support from Ba’aysir, Dulmatin went on to establish his own 
training complex in Aceh under the name al-Qaida Indonesia Wilayah Serambi 
Mekkah.309 Here Dulmatin attempted to draw forth more recruits from the local populace 
and hoped to institute his plan titled lintas Tanzim, cross-organization; wherein regional 
bases of operations could be established from which both recruitment to the ideology and 
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militant group through dakwah within the communities and further attacks on the state 
could be planned and orchestrated from.310 Dulmatin was further joined by Oman 
Rochman, known also as Aman Abdurrahman, a radical cleric who espoused and justified 
violent jihad in the name of instituting shari’a as the guiding jurisprudence for all 
Indonesians and the killing of those blocking its institution.311 Together, Dulmatin and 
Abdurrahman hoped the lintas Tanzim plan would further re-unite many of the disparate 
jihadist splinter groups that had appeared with JI’s disavowal of the use of violent means, 
and further provide them with the structure, operational, and long-term strategic guidance 
they perceived as lacking within the jihadist movement.312 Ultimately, the project failed 
to coopt additional Acehnese to the cause and the jihadist camp’s activities and location 
were relayed to the authorities by locals; resulting in the POLRI and Densus-88 March 
2010 raid of the camp wherein 48 jihadists were arrested and 8 killed with Dulmatin 
among them.313 For his part in the provision of direct support through funding and 
advising of Dulmatin, Bays’ir would be convicted and receive a 15-year sentence.314 
Undeterred by these setbacks, the resiliency of multiple jihadist groups continued 
to emerge in AQA’s wake from 2010 and into 2013 with the continued focus of jihadist 
group efforts on both the “far” and “near” enemy. Here groups such as JAT, MIT, the 
short lived Mujahidin Indonesian Barat (MIB), HASMI, the Sunni Movement for 
Indonesian Society, the Abu Hanifah Cell, and Abu Omar’s network, operating out of 
West Java, planned to attack multiple foreign targets such as the foiled plot to bomb 
Myanmar’s Embassy in response to that country’s handling of the Muslim Rohingya 
refugee crisis in 2013.315 Despite the facts on the ground—the limited scope of 
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operations and dwindling resources—the attacks continued with Santoso’s MIT 
straddling the timeframes by initiating an all out campaign against the local POLRI units 
and Densus-88 throughout the mountainous Sulawesi region beginning in 2011 and 
continuing to the present day.316 MIT would further become the premier jihadist group in 
Indonesia for militant training, garnishing support and members from Sumatra, Sulawesi, 
East Kalimantin, Nusa Tenggara Barat, and Java, and serve as one of the base elements 
for IS initiatives in the region through its headquarters and “qaedah aminah”—secure 
base—outside Poso, Sulawesi.317 
2. Jihadist Transnational Terrorist Influences Remerge–2013–2016
The emergence of the Syrian civil war and the rise of the IS would 
reinvigorate transnational jihadist ideologies that would alter the scope of the 
Indonesian jihadist threat. First, as the seeds for such rejuvenation had already been laid 
and maintained with the continued desire to focus on the “near” and “far” enemy 
through violent means by many of the domestic Indonesian jihadist groups from 2009–
12. Second, as a result of the Syrian conflict transnational jihadist ideological influences
were rejuvenated via the Islamic “eschatology” surrounding the end of days prophecies 
and jihad in the defense of Muslims under threat as championed by the IS propaganda 
machine.318 Here prophetic predictions, nubuwat, foretell of the commencement of the 
apocalyptic battle, “Malhamah al-Kubra,” between the armies of the “true believers” and 
“infidels” that will usher in the final days; set to take place within the region of “Sham,” 
or the Levant region encompassing Syria, Palestine, Lebanon, Jordan, and Israel.319 
Together, these factors would come to pose three main threats to Indonesia: First, 
a resurgence of domestic jihadist group unification and solidarity through declared IS or 
ANF bai’at, support or allegiance. Second, an unprecedented number of Indonesian 
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foreign fighters—reported to potentially be as high as 800 strong (though likely to be 
around 500–600 given those intercepted by authorities, killed in combat action, or 
returned home)—have been drawn to the region ushering in unique threats.320 Finally, 
the third factor lies with the desires of the IS to expand its outreach with the incorporation 
of a Southeast Asian wilayat, IS sponsored and affiliated province, potentially in 
Sulawesi or to the direct north in the neighboring islands of southwest Philippines.321 
a. A Reinvigorated Yet Divisive Jihadist Home Front 
The Syrian conflict has served to simultaneously galvanize and unite the disparate 
Indonesian domestic jihadist groups along two fronts. Individual jihadists and radical 
jihadist groups would be forced to align their affiliation and pledge of bai’at to either 
AQ’s ANF or the IS with neither group holding complete sway over Indonesia’s jihadists. 
JI proper, Majelis Mujahidin Indonesia, Jamaah Anshorul Syariat (JAS)—a militant 
offshoot spawned from JAT with the sons of Ba’asyir (Abdul Rahim and Abdul Roshid) 
due to Ba’asyir’s pledge to IS—continue to maintain the traditional alignment of support 
and efforts to AQ and ANF.322 While ardent advocates of Islamic fundamentalism and 
the use of armed jihad to achieve its goals, these groups neither agree with the IS’s 
ideology, means, and ways—the “wholesale” killing of innocent Muslims and non-
believers—nor view the IS as the legitimate, reincarnated Caliphate under the leadership 
of Cali Ibrahim, al-Baghdadi.323 
On the other hand, the IS’s mass appeal, propaganda, and pledged support have 
served to loosely unite or at the least align loyalties and objectives of nearly a dozen 
Indonesian domestic radical jihadist groups (despite initial reports to the contrary). Led 
by the endorsement of spiritual clerics Ba’aysir and Abdurrahman and the currently 
active jihadist Santoso, commander of MIT, the list of IS advocates captured by Fealy, 
Schulze, IPAC, and others consists of: MIT (the first to swear IS allegiance), MIB, JAT, 
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Jamaah Tawhid wal Jihad (JTJ), the Forum Pendukung Daulah Islamiyah (FPDI), the 
Bima Group, Katibah al-Iman, Ring Banten, Laskar Jundullah, Forum Aktivis Syariat 
Islam (FAKSI), and Gerakan Mahasiswa Untuk Syariat Islam (Gema Salam).324 Between 
August and November of 2015, the leaders and members of these and other groups met 
and began discussions. The discussions centered on establishing a united front or 
coalition from which a more focused unity of effort in establishing the Daulah Islamiyah 
Nusantara, the Indonesian Islamic State, could be garnered.325 This gathering, first under 
the unofficial term given by Indonesian intelligence circles, Jamaah Ansharut Daulah 
(JAD)—Partisans of the Sate Group—in March 2015, was followed officially by the 
jihadists themselves with the founding of Ansharud Daulah Islamiyah (ADI)—Partisans 
of the Islamic State—in August 2015, which was again later changed to Jamaah Anshar 
Khilafah (JAK)—Partisans of the Caliphate—by November 20, 2015, as the goals and 
methodologies became more focused and aligned with those of the IS.326 Even here all IS 
supporters are not behind JAK as some such as Abdur Rohim bin Thoyib, Abu Husna, 
refused to join JAK and formed Katibah al-Iman, though he stated he would continue to 
advise and work with JAK members.327 As demonstrated by tracing the actions and the 
threats posed by the diverse jihadist groups in the previous timeframes leading up to the 
present, IPAC stated, “Pro-ISIS groups in Indonesia have emerged from existing radical 
networks that have never gone away. They may have morphed, realigned, regrouped and 
regenerated but they are not new.”328 
Distinct to the contemporary jihadist threat to Indonesia is the support for the IS 
that has manifested throughout society beyond the traditional jihadist networks. This has 
taken form through three methods: first, by mass demonstrations of pledged bai’at in the  
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public domain; second, through social media channels and one-on-one methods within 
the private domains; and third, through the state prison systems where both mass and 
private pledging ceremonies have taken place.329 Together these domains have 
collectively seen pro-IS individuals participating in the thousands.330 Of these, the social 
media and Internet domains have been the most daunting to track and mitigate by CT 
officials while conversely providing an effective means for IS propaganda 
dissemination.331 By these means, the IS may recruit directly via to prospective 
candidates through chat rooms, websites posting various written documents and blogs, 
and the use of high quality produced and extremely graphic videos of jihadists in 
action.332 One such site is Millah Ibrahim, which according to Fealy is one of the highest 
visited and main pro-IS sites, that possesses a visitor-counter that as of January 2016 
depicted 700,000 visitors of which 172,000 emanated from Indonesia.333 The potential 
for further exposure of Indonesians to IS propaganda is only growing as seen in the 2011 
statistics provided by Techinasia, a private Singapore based media and technology firm, 
that reported 35.4 million Indonesians were already using Facebook—the second largest 
and growing Facebook population in the world—with another 4.8 million engaged on 
Twitter—the fourth largest and growing population in the world.334 
The high capacity for mobilization imparted within these environments, whether 
at the individual and or collective levels through declared bai’at or tacit support has 
magnified the means and ways by which Indonesians may participate in pro-ISIS 
activities.335 These activities are diverse and may consist of the provision of funding and 
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resources, support to deployed foreign fighters and their families, the furthering of 
propaganda efforts, the conduct of recruitment, and the translating of Arabic jihadist 
manuscripts etc.336 Therefore, the number of participants may incalculable and beyond 
the ability to effectively track and efficiently monitor by CT agencies. 
b. The Foreign Fighter Phenomena 
The potency of the threat posed by Indonesian foreign fighters fighting in the 
Levant for both ANF and IS emanates from multiple factors. These unique factors are 
first seen with the speed by which the number of Indonesian foreign fighters have 
amassed under the black banners of IS and ANF forces when compared to the 
Mujahedeen and AQ in the Soviet Afghan and Afghan civil wars of the 1980s and ‘90s. 
Unlike the gradual buildup of Indonesian foreign fighter departures to South Asia that 
attracted approximately 300–400 fighters over the course of a decade, in a matter of only 
two years, beginning in 2013, that number has nearly doubled with those going to IS and 
ANF in Syria.337 Second, IS in particular has greatly expanded upon an approach 
employed by mujahedeen affiliates in the past through Malay foreign fighter inclusion 
regarding tactical, operational, and strategic initiatives (strategic initiatives to be covered 
under the third threat factor of a Southeast Asian wilayat).338 
For Ba’aysir and other Malays looking to get to the battlefields and training 
camps of Afghanistan and Pakistan from the 1980s through ‘90s, the first stop consisted 
of indoctrination and basic training with the Al-Ghuraba cell out of Karachi, Pakistan.339 
Often this is as far as the Indonesian “mujahedeen” got with even fewer numbers actually 
experiencing combat. Under the IS construct implemented on September 26, 2014, Malay 
fighters traveling from the Southeast Asian nations of Malaysia and Indonesia, 
Singapore, Cambodia, South Vietnam, and the Philippines have been organized and  
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incorporated into the Katibah Nusantara Lid Daulah Islamiyah, the Malay Archipelago 
Unit, that was later named the Majmu’ah Persiapan Al Arkhabily, the Archipelago 
Group-in-Preparation, before utilization elsewhere in the IS.340 Located in al-Shadadi, al-
Hasakah province of Syria and established in September of 2014, the new Malay foreign 
fighters to the region receive months of ideological indoctrination, extensive and focused 
military training—topics consisting of tactics, strategy, and weapons specialization 
ranging from sniper, individual, and crew served weapons employment and bomb 
making—basic Arabic language training, and finally assessment for utilization within the 
IS.341 Following this initial training, IS utilization of the Malays has ranged from suicide 
bombers (approximately 20%), forward deployed infantry, IS guard forces, various 
leadership positions, and other IS administrative roles.342 This approach and directed 
attention by the IS with Malay foreign fighters of the MPA resulted in the group 
achieving a string of successes on the battlefield in April of 2015 with the capture of five 
previously held Kurdish areas within Syria.343 
Recent in-fighting between the MPA’s commander Bahrumsyah and Abu Jandal 
in mid 2015 over payment allocations to the fighters led to a break up with the formation 
of a second katibah established as the Katibah Masyaariq (KM), Forces of the East, that 
would be based in Homs.344 Additionally, the potential emergence of yet another 
Southeast Asian group in Syria called the Mujahideen Jawi (MJ)—reported to have been 
established sometime in January 2016 and composed of Malays from Indonesia, 
Malaysia, southern Thailand, and the Philippines—may further enable other Indonesian 
jihadist groups with differing goals and beliefs to gain critically needed combat  
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experiences.345 Due to the groups’ fairly recent establishment, additional information is 
not currently known. With these elements all engaged in highly kinetic and prolonged 
combat environments, the exact numbers of those jihadists killed under the banner of IS 
has been hard to determine with analysts believing the number to be around 60, with the 
core element of the MPA now estimated at numbering 24–36 due to combat losses and 
splintering with the KM.346 
Conversely to the IS foreign fighters from both existing Indonesian jihadist 
groups and the masses, many of those traveling to Syria to join ANF have come strictly 
from JI proper, who maintained its AQ allegiances and disavowed IS practices and 
legitimacy.347 JI closely vetted and screened those who have been sent, originally under 
the pretext of providing humanitarian assistance and support through its Hilal Ahmar 
Society Indonesia (HASI), which has sent nearly a dozen delegations to the region 
between 2012 and ’14.348 The numbers supporting ANF from JI have been estimated to 
be under 50 and reported to be composed primarily of non-combatants performing roles 
such as humanitarian support, Arabic-Malay translations, and scholarly religious work of 
the JI core tenants of dakwah and tarbiyah staying months at a time in theater.349 Though 
non-combat in nature and non-IS aligned, some of these delegations and individuals have 
already or plan to return to Indonesia.350 
For the most part the numbers of foreign fighter returnees have been low, believed 
to be in the twenties to date, with many having been deported from Turkey, caught in 
transit, or those that had become disenfranchised with the IS.351 Per Jones, the 
preponderance of the 200 deported by Turkey and other states are those jihadists heading 
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to the combat zone accompanied with family and children.352 Fears of arrests by 
Indonesian authorities are further compounded by the desires of many jihadists to remain 
in defense of the Caliphate and or die within the Levant as martyrs as opposed to on 
Indonesian soil prevents others from returning.353 
c. The IS Southeast Asian Wilayat 
Initially, the designs and aims of Indonesian jihadists and IS alike were for 
foreign fighters to travel and take up arms under the black banner on the soil of the 
Levant, with the general aims of sowing discord and furthering IS recruitment within 
Indonesia.354 With JAK and other Indonesian jihadists groups advocating and fighting for 
an Islamic State of Indonesia, the IS’s overtures for the establishment of a wilayat in the 
region may further entice these groups and others to refocus domestic activities toward 
these mutually supporting ends-states.355 Two developments would appear early in 2014 
and by late 2015 that would further enable this shift in a strategic paradigm. First, the 
actions of Indonesian authorities in concert with states such as Turkey, Singapore, and 
Malaysia were now making travel to the Levant a much more difficult and risky venture 
with a high probability of interdiction by state authorities.356 Second, the heightened 
Indonesian jihadist’s interest in a Southeast Asian Caliphate and the growing success of 
the IS’s MPA construct further refocused IS global ambitions and its strategic calculus 
surrounding both Indonesia and Southeast Asia.357 These two mutually supporting factors 
led to further calls to action by jihadists and IS supporters to take up arms on the 
domestic, Indonesian front by Indonesian jihadist leaders such as Bahrun Naim—directly 
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linked to the January 14th Jakarta attacks—from within the IS and by the Indonesian 
jihadist groups alike.358 These consist of jihadist leaders such as Abu Muhammad al-
Adnani—calling for the targeting of the “far” enemy, “wherever they may be found,” as 
early as February 2015—and Indonesian jihadist cleric Aman Abdurrahman who issued 
the following fatwa in the days preceding the January 2016 Jakarta attack: 
Emigrate [hijrah] to the Islamic State and if you cannot emigrate, then 
wage jihad with spirit wherever you are, and if you cannot wage war or 
you lack the courage to do so, then contribute your wealth to those who 
are willing to do so. And if you cannot contribute, then urge others to 
undertake jihad. And if you cannot do that, then what is the meaning of 
your loyalty oath [bai’at]?359 
For Southeast Asia, this call to take up arms would further reinforce the re-emergent calls 
for a pan-regional Southeast Asian Caliphate as once advocated for by the likes of JI.360 
The concept of taking the fight to the domestic home-fronts of the foreign fighters 
and the establishment of a Southeast Asian Caliphate may potentially have been in the 
strategic plans of al-Baghdadi and the IS all along going back as early as 2014.361 This is 
seen with the IS’s second intended use of the MPA: to form and prepare a vanguard of IS 
vetted and battle tested Southeast Asian jihadists to one day return to the region and 
create a “distant caliphate” or linked wilayat, IS province.362 This wilayat would be 
similar in design and scope to that underway within Libya at the time of this writing.363 
This strategic shift by the IS regarding Indonesia and Southeast Asia was captured by the 
Institute for the Study of War (ISW) which in November of 2015 depicted a map of the 
Southeast Asian region as considered the, “Far Abroad Ring,” wherein jihadists were to, 
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“Attack and polarize,” the Muslim states deemed apostate or the “near” enemy.364 By 
March 2016, ISW reports and a new map graphic depicted an IS strategic shift for the 
region as the IS now considered the region the, “Near Abroad Ring,” with goals to, 
“Establish affiliates and increase disorder.”365 Additionally, sharp rhetoric by MPA 
members toward officials back home throughout 2015 and ’16 increased and led to the 
posting of a video in Malay on January 25, 2016 that further warned Malaysian and other 
Southeast Asian officials for their continued arrests of pro-IS jihadists.366 These threats, 
while not turning into actual attacks, have demonstrated a continued focus on the region 
and the foreboding of future attacks to come.367 
With the location left undeclared, Southeast Asian jihadists from the Philippines 
and Indonesia, both abroad in the Levant and domestically at home, have been vying for 
the prestigious recognition as the declared IS wilayat.368 Locations under consideration 
consist of the southwest islands of the Philippines—under aligned groups Abu Sayyaf 
Group and the Bangsamoro Islamic Freedom Fighters—or within Indonesia’s highly 
mountainous island of Sulawesi—home to IS and JAK aligned MIT who currently 
controls a small mountain top track of territory outside Poso in Sulawesi.369 This island 
has been a hotbed of jihadist activity and focus going back to the communal violence of 
the post-Suharto era, JI’s attempts to establish a headquarters in 2008 as a point from 
which to grow the Islamic State, and to Santoso’s MIT jihadist training camps and 
continued fight against the government to the present day.370 
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B. THE STATE RESPONSE 
Despite the appearance of similar threats facing the state as in the days of 1998–
2001, distinct to the 2009-present timeframe would be the state’s response to the nature 
of the transnational jihadist threat and mobilization of domestic radical Islamic groups. 
With the established criminal justice CT model in place, complete with the capacity and 
highly professionalized capabilities of the POLRI, obtained during the 2002–08 
timeframe, the Indonesian government was now postured to maintain the pressure and 
attempt to gain the initiative over the jihadist groups. This would transpire first through a 
shift in the outlook on the jihadist threat in 2009; second, through the continued and 
steady execution of “hard” CT measures consisting of further institutional capacity 
building, arrests and killing of jihadist members and leadership; and finally third, a shift 
in focus on combating the IS ideology with the continued and increased conduct of the 
“soft” CT measures. 
1. Shifting Outlooks, Continued Capacity Growth, and “Hard” CT 
Measures 
Following the Jakarta bombings of 2009 and the foiled assassination attempt on 
SBY—executed and planned by Top’s AQA—Indonesia began to transform its views on 
the threat posed by transnational jihadist terrorism from one of terrorism as an act of 
criminal behavior posing a danger to the lives of its civilians and foreign interests to that 
of one as a substantiated threat to the state’s national security.371 The revenge and 
retaliation centric attacks conducted by the jihadists naturally led to the targeting of the 
Indonesian officials, culminating in the assassination attempt on the president. 
This shift in view by the government, subsequently led to the creation of yet more 
state CT institutions and capacity. With the intelligence oversight of the foiled 
assassination attempt and other perceived CT mishandlings by the POLRI going back to 
2009, the TNI would now be incorporated to form a more cohesive CT response by the 
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national security elements.372 In 2010, through “Presidential Decree No 46/2010,” the 
Badan Nasional Penanggulangan Terorisme—the National Counter Terrorism Agency—
was established under the leadership of General Ansyaad Mbai.373 Functionally, the 
BNPT was designed to prevent terrorism not only by formulating CT policies regarding 
prevention and institutional capacity enhancements, but to further coordinate and oversee 
the execution of operations to be conducted by both the TNI Special Forces units and the 
POLRI with Densus-88.374 The BNPT would further be responsible for the delicate 
orchestration between efforts by the TNI and the POLRI, the judicial system, and wider 
Islamic “civil society.”375 Past animosities and rivalries between the TNI and POLRI—
the two branches responsible for state security—stemming from differences in the 
manner of delineating areas of responsibility, supported-supporting roles, and resource 
allocation dating back to earlier timeframes complicated the BNPT’s initial efforts.376 
Furthermore, the organization had to overcome these and other issues such as charges of 
corruption and human rights violations against Densus-88 that may have slowed its initial 
effectiveness in the early years of its establishment.377 These issues appeared to have 
worked themselves out as the TNI special operations units had taken a supportive role, 
with Densus-88 remaining the lead strike element in operational execution from 2012.378 
Yet by 2014–15, the rising political influence of the TNI with the president coupled with 
the POLRI’s inability to capture Santoso, together enabled the TNI to conduct 
“exercises” with the goal of locating Santoso themselves.379 This was generally viewed 
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by the POLRI as an attempt by the TNI to further carve out a more prominent CT role.380 
Issues for the BNPT now consist of getting the appropriate amount of funding, resources, 
and institutionalized methodologies for programs such as the ill-developed “soft” CT 
measures.381 In addition to the BNPT, by 2011 a new “Intelligence Bill” was passed that 
allowed the BIN to conduct intelligence through the implementation of “hard” CT 
measures (before now unseen within the new democracy) such as enhanced 
interrogations, wiretapping, funds tracking that immediately invoked calls for its repeal 
by Islamists and human rights advocacies alike.382 
Following the 2009 attacks and through the course of 2010, raids and arrests by 
the POLRI and the subsequent judicial convictions were greatly ramped up, peaking at 
over 100 as seen in Chapter III, Figure 5: Convicted Terrorists in Indonesia, 2000–
2012.383 This response was also taken in the wake of jihadist actions that were seen 
previously over the course of 2003 in the wake of Bali-I and the subsequent jihadist 
bombing campaign through 2005.384 The arrests and the killing of key leadership and 
other jihadi members during the conduct of Densus-88 raids is another feature that 
persisted into this timeframe and earned much backlash and demonstrations by right wing 
Islamic conservative organizations and radical groups. Coincidentally, many of these 
groups are those with direct links to militant groups such as HASMI, Hizb ut-Tahir, 
JI/JAT, and others.385 The targeting and “liquidation” of many members of the jihadi 
leadership was demonstrated time and time again with the killing of Top, Dulmatin, and 
Santoso’s second in command Daeng Koro in April 2015—said to be the key element of 
MIT’s military training program that likely trained hundreds of jihadists from 2010–
2014.386 This targeting and neutralization of many of the top jihadist leadership has been  
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effective in dampening the effectiveness and lethality of the groups, as captured by 
Acharya who cited that, “According to a report of the Institute for Economics and Peace, 
Indonesia was among five countries in the world that witnessed the largest decrease in the 
impact of terrorism, rising to 29th position in 2011 from 9th position in 2002.”387 The 
leadership targeting has not been as completely effective as it could be. Those leaders not 
killed but arrested, such as Ba’asyir and Abdurrahman, are currently serving long jail 
sentences in state prisons where the lax prison rules and access to communications has 
enabled both to continue to serve as the ideological mouthpieces for pro-IS groups such 
as JAT and the JAK coalition.388 In addition, the targeting came at a high cost as Santoso 
and his jihadist’s campaign of retribution attacks on the regional POLRI units and 
outposts demonstrated.389 
Despite the creation of the BNPT and incorporation of special operations units of 
the TNI, Indonesia’s “hard” CT responses to the IS threat has continued to rely heavily 
upon the conduct of arrests and the targeting of leadership by Densus-88.390 These 
operations end not only with arrests, but with high numbers of jihadist leaders and 
members killed.391 As of June 2015, over 274 jihadists were arrested and incarcerated 
within 26 different prisons.392 Where the scope of arrests earlier in this timeframe were 
focused primarily within Sulawesi, West Java, Aceh, and Kalimantan, arrests of pro-IS 
supporters and affiliated jihadists is more pervasive and spread out across the entire 
archipelago as seen within Figure 7.393 Here, pro-IS arrests have been conducted in 
nearly every major region and main-island of the state with the same further focus points 
of south Sulawesi, West Java, Sumatra, and Kalimantan.394 
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Figure 7.  Indonesian Separatist, Communal, and Jihadist Violence, 
1965–2016.395 
The pervasive threat of pro-IS activities across the archipelago and the rising 
number of Indonesian foreign fighters, led Indonesian CT authorities to make further 
adjustments beginning in 2014. In the wake of IS propaganda and calls to join the fight 
abroad or at home in August of 2014, in September President Yudboyono issued a 
statement revealing a “Seven-Point Instruction,” that sought to direct the state’s response 
in a more tailored manner to combat the emergent and unique IS threats.396 These points 
consist of efforts to ultimately deter, prevent, and punish those Indonesians supporting or 
participating in pro-IS activities and foreign fighting: 1. Selective issuance of passports 
and visas to the Middle East; 2. Enhanced monitoring of those already in Syria and Iraq; 
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3. Stricter monitoring of foreigners within Indonesia; 4. Improved prison security and 
monitoring of incarcerated terrorists; 5. Increased and enhanced security measures within 
regions of jihadist activities (Poso, Ambon, East Java, and Central Java); 6. Focused 
attention addressing and countering the IS ideology; 7. Stronger prosecution and 
punishments for convicted jihadist terrorists.397 Problems immediately arose as to how 
and by what judicial mechanisms these overtures could be enforced to effect change and 
see improvements. The BNPT’s director Mbai stated shortly after that some judicial 
mechanisms already existed that could be utilized such as Article 23 of the 2006 
Citizenship Law, that IPAC cited as stating that Indonesians could be arrested who, 
“Voluntarily takes an oath or declares loyalty to a foreign state or part of such a state.”398 
The “Seven-Point Instruction” has yet to be implemented by the newly elected President 
WiDoDo as he is currently deciding upon an interim emergency government regulation, 
perppu, that will further restrict IS support along those very lines.399 
2. “Soft” CT Measures Explored: Addressing the Ideology 
While the conduct of “hard” CT measures saw little change in the response to IS, 
the government would embark upon a fundamental shift in its CT strategies in combating 
the mobilization of IS inspired jihadist groups by focusing on the ideology. This was 
reinforced following the January 14th attacks with Luhut Binsar Panjaitan, Minister for 
Political, Legal, and Security Affairs, stating that, “The Government is planning to take a 
soft approach toward alleged IS sympathizers, in contrast to Western counterterrorism 
practices.”400 This shift came in the wake of the call to arms video titled, “Joining the 
Ranks,” airing on You Tube 23 July 2014 that consisted of an Indonesian jihadist urging 
Indonesians to support and pledge their allegiances to the IS, a religious-state entity at 
odds with the principles of the Republic of Indonesia. To the Indonesian government this 
threat directly challenged the notions of national loyalty and ethos of Pancasila, 
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specifically that of “Unity in Diversity.”401 Thus it was not enough to simply arrest or kill 
the jihadist IS supporters and leave the ideology alone to further fester. That month 
security officials of the POLRI, TNI, and BIN, led by the BNPT and Coordinating 
Minister of Security Djoko Suyanto, declared the IS a “banned organization.”402 This 
group of officials was further quoted by IPAC as stating that there would now be, “An 
all-government effort to prevent the establishment of IS branches and the dissemination 
of its teachings.”403 
A unique element incorporated in combating the IS ideological narrative is the 
State’s drive to create institutionalized deradicalisation and disengagement program 
capacities. Additionally, the state reached out to the Islamic civil society to further 
legitimize and assist the “soft” CT efforts in achieving better effects throughout the wider 
public and jihadist in the prison systems.404 To tackle one of its core tasks of 
“prevention,” the BNPT produced a strategic four-year plan with four principle goals in 
2011: 1. Projecting the state’s CT narrative through increased awareness; 2. Protecting 
critical infrastructure and public domains from terrorist acts; 3. Confronting and 
mitigating the terrorist ideology; and 4. Preventing the spread and reducing the effect of 
the jihadist ideology through disengagement and de-radicalization programs.405 To effect 
these objectives with the lofty goal of 80% implementation across these fronts by 2014, 
in 2012 the BNPT further created the Forum Koordinasi Pencegahan Terorism 
(FKPT).406 The FKPT would consist of local clerics, scholars, leaders, and organizations 
existing at the provincial level—existing in 23 of 34 by 2014’s end—that would 
implement the counter ideological discussions and events.407 The BNPT further 
expanded the programs’ participants to not only include the moderate, mainstream 
Islamic organizations of Nahdhlatul-Ulama (NU) and Muhammadiyah, but the 
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incorporation of the Majelis Ulama Indonesia—Council of Indonesian Ulama—(MUI), 
the Ministry of Religion and universities such as the Islamic State University of 
Surakarta, and the Indonesian Institute of Sciences, as well as other non-governmental 
organizations.408 This inclusion brought about outreach that could further target the 
youth, the demographic believed to be the most exposed and susceptible to the IS 
ideology, through means and ways such as sports programs, movies, advertisements, and 
public assemblies.409 
On the front of disengagement and de-radicalization the State looked to map out a 
more cohesive and delineated program through multiple institutionalized programs 
beginning in 2013. This was initiated with the BNPT in concert with the Indonesian 
independent counter Islamic radicalization think-tank, the Nusa Institute, and the drafting 
of the Deradicalisation Blueprint that outlined the means and ways to go about collecting 
data on radical jihadist prisoners and the subsequent provision of treatment to achieve de-
radicalization or disengagement end-states.410 To monitor progress and further coordinate 
the programs along other ministries within the state, the BNPT instituted the Program 
Nasional Pencegahan Terorisme—National Terrorism Prevention Program—(PNPT).411 
In addition to tackling the initial issue of funding, the PNPT focused its efforts on those 
regions and provinces most affected by the jihadist ideology with pointed efforts to 
reinforce anti-jihadist ideology throughout the school systems, mosques, television 
broadcast networks, and prisons.412 For the prisoners, ex-prisoners, and their families 
alike, occupational outreach and support programs were further implemented.413 
Augmenting these efforts though with far less coordination, unity of effort, or division of 
labor and responsibilities between the numerous governmental agencies involved (the 
BNPT, TNI, and Corrections system) was the institution and building of the Indonesian 
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Peace and Security Centre (IPSC) in Sentul, West Java.414 While designed initially to 
handle the hardcore jihadists, the facility shifted focus to that of a “rehabilitation” and 
transition site for soon to be released prisoners.415 
Yet despite these institutional capacity advancements, the effectiveness of the 
“soft” measure employment is difficult to gauge and the results are mixed. Since the Bali-
I bombings and pointed CT measures by the state, Indonesia has arrested approximately 
900 radicals with over 600 convicted for terrorism and incarcerated, a number that is 
surely to grow with recent arrests of pro-IS affiliates.416 Of these individuals 
incarcerated, Idris and Taufiqurrohman cite that only 200 have participated directly 
within deradicalisation and disengagement programs with 23 of these having returned to 
jihadist activities upon release.417 Many radical Islamic non-governmental 
organizations—Gerakan Sehari Seribu (GASHIBU), the Infaq Dakwah Centre (IDC), 
and Yayasan Rumah Putih—have been cited by Acharya as taking measures to undermine 
government efforts by protesting in public, distributing counter propaganda, and 
providing funds to the families of prisoners and newly released prisoners.418 
C. ASSESSMENT 
This timeframe of 2009–2016 has witnessed similar threats to Indonesia at the 
horizontal and vertical security levels that the new democracy had faced in 1998–2001. 
Yet two distinct themes exist within this timeframe seen by the nature of the threat posed 
with the re-emergent, ominous transnational influences and the shift in focus in the means 
and ways of combating the jihadist threat by the state. First is the re-emergent influences 
of transnational actors upon the domestic jihadist scene that have brought about the 
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foreign fighter dilemma and the mobilization of jihadist radical groups into a more 
unified, yet still fractured, front that portends a more active and lethal jihadist threat. 
Second, the shift in the Indonesian government’s view on the designation of the level of 
threat the jihadists posed led to the focusing of efforts toward targeting the IS ideology 
via “soft” measures. These “soft” measures have been further reinforced by the growing 
anti-IS public sentiments. 
1. Transnational Influences and Lethality 
The ability and willingness by domestic jihadist actors to be influenced and even 
incorporated within transnationally oriented group strategies, whether the ANF or IS, 
while simultaneously retaining domestically nuanced goals and campaigns has reemerged 
during this timeframe.419 This methodology as outlined by Burke, was employed by the 
likes of Top, Dulmatin and carried further by Santoso and his affiliates in the present 
day.420 This combination of mutually supporting domestic and transnational jihadist 
objectives and strategies may portend a contemporary shift in Indonesian jihadist group 
activities and lethality. This phenomenon would be similar to that seen when JI and AQ 
attempted to align efforts in the previous timeframe as demonstrated through the 
increased lethality rates witnessed in Figure 4: Average Lethality Rate per Terrorist 
Attack, 2002–2008.421 While the data by the GTD has yet to be collected for the 
timeframe depicting the influences of the Syrian conflict and the rise of IS from 2015 to 
the present, we may still derive insights as to the projections of Indonesian jihadism in 
lieu of the contemporary developments. As depicted in Figure 8, this timeframe would 
see acts of terror conducted by jihadists accounting for 19% (MIT 7%, JAT 5%, JI 4%, 
and Muslim Fundamentalists 3%) of the total attacks experienced by Indonesia and 
inflicting an aggregate lethality rate of 3.8 per attack over the course of the timeframe of 
2009–2014 as seen in Figure 9 (JI 10.5, MIT 1.9, JAT 1, and Muslim Fundamentalists 
1.6).422 
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Figure 8.  Terrorist Attacks by Group, 2009–2014.423 
 
Figure 9.  Average Lethality Rate per Terrorist Group per Attack, 2009–2014.424 
 
 
                                                 





















While the “unknown” category remains the largest, the combined impact of 
jihadist terrorist activity seen in the high value targets chosen and the high percentage of 
attacks compounded by the continued high lethality rate (though degraded from other 
timeframes) further reinforce the Indonesian authorities justification for the levying of 
jihadist terrorism as a threat to national security in the present day. 
Though the “far” enemy may have been the lofty and highly prized targets for the 
jihadist groups during the first part of this timeframe, the main focus and actual attention 
of these groups’ actions remained a combination of revenge based assassinations and 
bombing attacks on local police stations, local officials, non-Muslims in Cirebon, 
Sulawesi, and Java and sprees of bank robberies.425 These actions were more often than 
not foiled or resulted in the death and arrests of many of the jihadists. Despite the efforts 
of Santoso and others, these disparate groups lacked not only unity, but shared the same 
problems of poor military training and education, lack of veterans with real combat 
experience, logistical resources (equipment and funding), and the requisite leadership up 
and down the chain of command across the functional aspects of warfare.426 The 
cumulative effect of these factors was the resulting lack luster performance, 
effectiveness, and perceived drop in lethality as one jihadist group is replaced or 
“outperformed” by another as seen in Figure 10.427 
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Figure 10.  Jihadist Group Lethality Rates, 2009–2014.428 
Should the IS foreign fighters and radical non-combatants decide to return to 
Indonesia in mass numbers or individually selected by IS/ANF leadership, the current 
state of domestic jihadist affairs may experience a significant and dynamic shift. First, the 
current void in experienced domestic jihadist leadership and lack of combat tested, 
knowledgeable fighters will be filled.429 As detailed by Hegghammer’s study and 
demonstrated by the actions of returning Afghan foreign fighters within Indonesia’s not 
too distant past, should even a small percentage of these contemporary foreign fighters 
decide to engage in domestic jihad or the furthering of radical Islamic ideology the 
impact will be profound. The combat-tested jihadi veteran from the IS would bring not 
only enhanced jihadi clout or credibility to that domestic group—aiding further 
recruitment—but the enhancement to the groups’ operational efficiency, increased 
propensity to carry out attacks, and enhanced lethality; all of which portend a  
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disconcerting future for the state and its security forces.430 According to Fealy, JI’s prime 
directive in sending HASI delegations was to gain and enhance their member’s jihadist 
repertoire through enhanced networking and practical application experiences for the 
future establishment of an Islamic State on Indonesian soil.431 
The second principle threat of the reemerging transnational influences combined 
with these returning foreign fighting veterans and the capabilities they bring is their 
ability to influence current domestic jihadist groups in the bridging of the gap from the, 
“Low-tech and low-casualty,” based attacks occurring predominately against the “near” 
enemy to a more nuanced and more lethal return to targeting the additional, symbolic 
“far” enemy targets.432 While lacking in the desired level of lethality and demonstrated 
competency by the suspected JAK jihadist affiliates in the January 14, 2016, Jakarta 
business district attack—killing 8 and wounding 20—the complex nature and target 
selection represented both target selection forms consisting of local police for “near” and 
Starbucks for the “far” enemy—and further speaks to this manifestation.433 While the 
January 2016 attacks in Jakarta have generally been analyzed as a demonstration of 
continued inefficiency and degraded lethality, the degree of lethality as described in this 
study (those killed and wounded) portends an upward trend with JAK achieving a 
lethality rate of 28.434 
2. Indonesia’s CT Shifting Focus and Public Sentiment 
The government’s shifting views on its stance regarding the nature of the jihadist 
terrorism threat was demonstrated in this timeframe following the 2009 bombing and 
assassination attempt and the 2013 call to arms video by the IS. First the nature of the 
threat was elevated from that of purely a criminal in nature outlook, prevailing from  
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1998–2008, to that of a threat against national security. With such an elevation, the TNI 
would now have to be incorporated and play a larger role, potentially upsetting the very 
foundation of Indonesia’s criminal justice CT approach. Yet as seen previously, the 
POLRI and Densus-88 continued to maintain the lead in arrests and the conduct of raids. 
With the rise of IS and its brutal, intolerant ideology, the state further reinforced the 
sentiments of jihadist terrorism as a threat to national security and the very ideology and 
belief in the state’s principles of Pancasila.435 This recognition now caused the state to 
acknowledge and combat the extremist ideology it had long shied away from. This was 
addressed with the establishment of state capacity to better coordinate, monitor, and 
effect deradicalisation and disengagement programs. While believed to be incoherent and 
non-comprehensive by groups such as IPAC, the very fact that the government addressed 
first the institutional short falls and then the means and ways to include the additional 
elements of the wider civil society are evidence to the contrary.436 
While the government aggressively looked to grow state institutions and 
capabilities in response to the IS threat, in the critical CT realm of public support and 
hearts and minds, increasing anti-jihadist public sentiments further reinforced and 
positioned Indonesia to both counter and endure the jihadist propaganda and attacks. 
Since 2009, the anti-jihadist views have been on the rise as captured in a series of Pew 
polls. A 2009 Pew poll stated that 13% “often” or “sometimes” justified the use of 
suicide bombing, a number that would further drop to 6% in 2013.437 The 2013 Pew poll 
further underscored the notion of anti-jihadist views depicting that 93% “rarely” and 
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toward the actions and ideology of the IS has also seen such positive reinforcement with 
a 2015 Pew poll with an overwhelming 79% of the Indonesians polled possessing an 
“unfavorable” view of IS.439 Beyond the polls, the actions of the wider public have 
further reinforced this notion with banners and signs across the archipelago with IPAC 
reporting, “[name of town] rejects ISIS,”440 The disavowal of the IS and its ideology by 
nearly every Muslim organization manifested into the formation of a cohesive and united 
anti-IS front through the Forum Ukhuwah Islamiyah Majelis Ulama Undonesia (FU-
MUI) which declared its anti-IS stance and pro-government/Pancasila stance on August 
of 2014.441 Oddly enough, the comments made and the propaganda efforts of the AQ 
aligned jihadists has served to further galvanize the Indonesian public further away from 
the IS ideology and legitimacy.442 
D. CONCLUSION  
The combined effect of the shift from “hard” to “soft” in Indonesia’s CT approach 
and the continued anti-IS/jihadist public sentiment represent a momentous change in 
Indonesian CT policy. While not losing sight of the impact that “hard” CT measures had 
on jihadist organizational means and ways—demonstrated by Indonesia’s continued 
effective implementation of raids and arrests—the government broadened its efforts by 
instituting state-sanctioned capacity building in concert with civil society focused on 
“soft” measures. Though currently weak and failing to achieve its full potential 
effectiveness as noted by numerous analysts, it is nonetheless an action that pointedly 
addresses the long-term ideological element of the fight against jihadist terrorism. Thus 
this timeframe has still witnessed—despite the weak level of “soft” measure 
effectiveness—Indonesia’s criminal justice CT approach having achieved the institution  
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of a “comprehensive” CT strategy, one that seeks to address and integrate both “hard” 
and “soft” CT measures. As Carpenter, Levitt, Simon, and Zarate, wrote: 
The conflict between these two visions [modernity and radical Islam] 
constitutes a struggle for the hearts and minds of the majority of Muslims, 
who abhor violence, but who—out of sympathy, apathy, or fear—will not 
or cannot confront the extremists in their communities. Any strategy, 
therefore, that does not skillfully contest the claims and actions of radical 
extremism cannot succeed.443 
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V. CONCLUSION 
Ironically, if we have been successful in preventing [and] deterring actual 
incidents, then complacency does tend to set in because we believe that 
nothing is ever going to happen. But that’s when you also need to still be 
alert and to be aware. And that’s true for members of the public as well as 
members of the security forces.444 
—Teo Chee Hean 
Singaporean Deputy Prime Minister and Home Affairs Minister 
A. INTRODUCTION 
The Syrian and Iraqi civil wars that gave rise to al-Nusra Front and the declaration 
of the Islamic State in the Levant (with the IS espousing for the establishment of distant 
wilayats, provinces) has rejuvenated the threat of transnational terrorism worldwide, 
drawing foreign and domestic jihadist fighters to the cause and ideology under the black 
flag. Indonesia—containing a large percentage of the world’s Muslim community—and 
Southeast Asia are among those targeted by these jihadist manifestations emanating out 
of the Middle East. This thesis has studied the evolution of the Indonesian government’s 
response to the threat of transnational and domestic jihadist terrorism and addressed the 
debate over its counterterrorism policy effectiveness. This thesis asked the question: has 
Indonesian policy on transnational terrorism been effective in combating the mobilization 
of radical Islamic groups? The views of CT analysts in the debate appear to be polarized 
between the views that either Indonesian CT is largely effective due to its 
professionalized CT capacity or conversely ineffective due to its lack of progress in 
certain specific arenas such as prison reform and effective “soft” CT employment. Yet on 
further inspection, a different counterterrorism narrative comes to light in concert with 
the “hybrid” hypothesis. This narrative denotes the implementation of a highly effective 
and comprehensive criminal justice CT approach that has developed over time, 
incorporating at first “hard” then “soft” CT measures as the Indonesian political 
conditions and public sentiments changed. As demonstrated, the overall system is more 
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analogous to that of a “pendulum swing,” going back and forth between periods of 
ineffectiveness and effectiveness. In this manner, the CT ineffectiveness of 1998–2001 
was followed in 2002–2008 by a period that mixed effectiveness and ineffectiveness, 
which reflect the combination of “hard” CT measures and limited “soft” CT measures. 
Finally, the period from 2009 to the present has witnessed relative effectiveness through 
“hard” CT measures with growing, yet weak “soft” capabilities. This “pendulum swing” 
phenomenon was cited by Acharya in regard to the jihadist threat itself, which has swung 
back and forth from incorporating domestic jihadist goals with those of transnational ones 
and then back to domestically oriented ones.445 
This chapter will serve as a summation of the prominent themes and trends that 
have emerged in Indonesian CT from 1998 to the present day. First, we will review the 
major themes and elements of Indonesia’s CT program drawn from each timeframe 
reviewed. Second, the Indonesian CT program shortfalls and policy recommendations for 
further combating the mobilization of domestic and transnational jihadist threats will be 
briefly described. Finally, a “step beyond” identified during the course of this research 
will be proposed for the conduct of further study. 
1. The Timeframes: A Summation 
Starting with Indonesia’s shift to a democracy in 1998, the near decade-and-a-half 
long campaign combating jihadist terrorism has been further broken down into three 
distinct time-periods: 1998–2001, 2002–2008, and 2009–present. In this manner, the 
prominent political and social issues considered by politicians and CT specialists were 
witnessed through the lenses of the threats that the Indonesian state faced at that time 
coupled with the state’s subsequent CT responses. By these means, the evolution and 
effectiveness of Indonesian CT was further measured against the context and interplay  
of three primary factors: CT policies chosen, the changing nature and evolution  
of the jihadist groups, and public opinion. These factors enabled the state the ability to 
build the capacity for the eventual implementation of an effective and comprehensive 
criminal justice CT approach inclusive of “hard” and “soft” methods. Evidence of the 
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effectiveness of these factors may be seen in the gradually degraded capabilities and 
lethality rates—those killed or wounded per terrorist attack—of the jihadists over the 
timeframe 2002 through 2014, evidenced by viewing the jihadist lethality rates in Figures 
6 and 10.446 With continued implementation of this approach and focus on identified 
shortfalls, Indonesia may be positioned to weather and combat the re-emergent 
transnationally influenced jihadist threats. The findings and lessons learned identified in 
this thesis may further assist countries whose demographics and political structures are 
similar to Indonesia’s in their CT strategy development, capacity building, and 
application.  
a. 1998–2001 
This timeframe was consumed by the threat of armed separatist movements and 
communal violence through the rise of militant laskars and radical Islamic groups which 
cumulatively set the conditions for the growing power and further manifestation of 
transnational jihadist actors through Jemaah Islamiyah (JI).447 This timeframe was 
demarcated with the state and public sentiments being inherently more focused on the 
larger threats toward state unity and integrity, and culminated with utilization of its 
limited resources, efforts, and attention to those ends. Simultaneously, the government 
became more aware of the growing presence of Islamization and the rise of Islamic 
radical groups emanating out of Java and other trouble spots spreading throughout the 
archipelago but could ill afford to confront the added political strife.448 Yet the ability of 
the state compounded by the unwillingness of its security forces to act against militant 
laskars was less direct and tangible than how it could respond to the separatists and 
resulted in a more passive or hands-off approach.449 To gain the ability to act during this 
politically volatile timeframe, the state sought to wrest control of the means and ways to 
enforce security away from the TNI, which had controlled them during the preceding 
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authoritarian era. Civilian influence was achieved by imparting a separation within the 
security sphere with the TNI made responsible for external, existential security threats 
and placing the POLRI in charge of domestic security issues and under direct civilian 
control.450 Thus with the act of terrorism already viewed as a criminal act by the 
government, it would fall on the POLRI’s shoulders to respond to the threat in the future. 
Despite these foundational advances, the timeframe would generally be marked by the 
government’s belief that the terrorist incidents were not a substantial and separate threat 
to be reckoned with. To the civil authorities, they were likely acts conducted by or linked 
to one of the numerous major threats already facing the state or by those seeking political 
influences.451 The state simply believed that the country did not suffer from a jihadist 
“terrorist problem.”452 
b. 2002–2008 
With the ascendance onto the jihadist world stage by JI in the wake of the Bali-I 
bombing in 2002 and the subsequent bombings that followed until Bali-II in 2005, 
Indonesia was not only be forced to come to grips with the fact that it possessed a jihadist 
terrorist problem, but quickly needed to implement CT measures and take actions to 
combat the emergent threat.453 The violent acts themselves and the senseless killing of 
innocent Muslims would galvanize the public’s and civic-minded laskars’ sentiments 
against the jihadist means and ways.454 These combined factors thus afforded the state 
the ability to take the measures and actions required through further CT capacity building 
along the criminal justice CT approach. Through international monetary aid and training 
support for POLRI intelligence, investigative, and special CT units such as Densus-88—
emanating primarily from Australia and the US—state CT capacity and its subsequent 
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professionalization were achieved.455 Simultaneous to the training and development was 
the employment of these capabilities through “hard” CT measures such as targeted 
leadership and member arrests and kills, and the implementation of the Anti-Terror Bill 
of 2003 and incarcerations by the judicial system.456 Though with minimal initial effects, 
the state also initiated its expansion of CT policies with the inclusion of “soft” measures 
consisting of deradicalization and disengagement programs. Together, all of these efforts 
contributed to the gradual collapse of JI’s pan-regional Southeast Asia designs and 
organizational infrastructure, the further degradation of the jihadist lethality rates 
(demonstrated in Figure 6), and the eventual evolution and shift of jihadist goals and 
objectives.457 This was vividly captured with JI’s disavowal of the use of violence—until 
another stated time in the future—to achieve the now changed desired end-state for an 
Islamic State of Indonesia.458 
c. 2009–2016 
Two distinct themes surfaced within this timeframe through the nature of the 
threat posed by domestic jihadist groups and re-emergent transnational influences from 
the Syria-Iraq conflicts and the IS, and the adapted CT outlook taken on by the state. 
First, the re-emergent influences of transnational actors upon the domestic jihadist scene 
have brought about a new jihadist dilemma. This dilemma appeared through the growth 
of jihadist foreign fighters coupled with the mobilization of domestic jihadist groups into 
a more unified, but fractured front. These developments portend a more active and lethal 
jihadist threat for Indonesia’s future. When the seasoned, combat-experienced foreign 
fighters of the now numerous Southeast Asian combat battalions within the IS make their 
way home, the long void in jihadist group leadership, military training, and operational 
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execution will be filled.459 The presence of veterans and the transnational influences 
upon groups such as JAK, may result in the potential for a higher propensity, complexity, 
and increased lethality in domestic jihadist attacks than those experienced previously 
during this timeframe as seen with the January 14, 2016, Jakarta attack that produced a 
lethality rate of 28 killed and wounded.460 These returnees will come home to already 
established IS or ANF aligned domestic jihadist groups such as JAK or JI/JAS who have 
adapted the ideologies and goals of the transnational actors to domestically nuanced 
campaigns with local and or regional goals.461 
The second prominent theme is the shift in the Indonesian government’s views on 
the jihadist threat itself and the subsequent change within its CT approach targeting the 
jihadist ideology. The focus is not only on “hard” CT measure employment but involves 
the inclusion of targeting the IS ideology via “soft” measures. Growing-anti-IS public 
sentiments have further reinforced the shift in CT measures. This shift in focus is a 
culmination of two singular events: the aborted assassination attempt on the president in 
2009 and the call for loyalty to the new caliphate of the IS in 2014. The former sparked a 
re-designation of the jihadist threat from a criminal act to one that posed a national 
security threat, while the later directly confronts the Indonesian state and principles of 
Pancasila.462 During the timeframe of 2002–2008, the state had gingerly tackled the issue 
of confronting the jihadist ideology, relying on grass roots initiatives within the POLRI 
and wider civil society.463 Now the jihadist ideology and later that of IS would be 
confronted directly with state institutions such as the BNPT directing and coordinating a 
“whole of government approach” in concert with direct civil society participation and the 
establishment of the Forum Koordinasi Pencegahan Terorisme.464 
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2. Policy Shortfalls and Recommendations 
Over the course of nearly a decade and a half of concerted efforts by the state, 
Indonesia has made much progress in establishing CT capacity and executing a criminal 
justice CT approach in a comprehensive manner. This execution, while incorporating 
both “hard” and “soft” measures has only recently shifted its trajectory via a concerted 
effort and focus on that of the jihadist ideology itself. While this shift in CT approach is 
in itself a tremendous milestone for Indonesia, the following CT policy shortfalls will be 
outlined in recommendation form for further combating and countering the transnational 
jihadist threats and mobilization of radical jihadist groups. 
To counter the threat of both the IS ideology and threat of further domestic 
mobilization, Indonesia must first look to implement former President Yudboyono’s, 
“Seven-Point Instruction” plan that sought to refine and specifically tailor the state’s CT 
efforts and responses against the threat posed by the IS.465 These tenets were inclusive 
and encompassed nearly all the prominent security threat themes and CT program 
shortfalls posed by both the IS influences and domestic jihadist elements. These areas 
span the ideology of IS, the handling of foreign fighters (both those going and those 
returning), passport controls, prison reforms, the allocation of CT resources and efforts 
toward specific trouble regions (Sulawesi, Moluccas, and Java), and judicial concerns 
ranging from prosecution mechanisms to incarceration term lengths.466 There is yet much 
to be seen in the realm of combating the jihadist and IS ideology as the BNPT’s FKPT 
initiative still requires further establishment throughout the remaining provinces, 
additional funding from the state, and better metrics at determining effectiveness.467 
Chief among the issues within the prisons is the non-segregation of pro-IS and jihadist 
terrorists from the general population, a situation that breeds further recruitment and 
jihadist recidivism upon release.468 While the support to IS has been banned, it lacks the 
clout and the mechanisms by which the judiciary enforcement may be carried out. The 
                                                 
465 IPAC, Evolution of ISIS, 20. 
466 Ibid., 20–21. 
467 IPAC, Countering Violent Extremism, 4. 
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current anti-terrorism laws lack the specific clauses for combating the challenges posed 
by the IS such as the going, training, and fighting abroad by Indonesians under the 
allegiances of a terrorist organization.469 
In addition to the “Seven-Points of Instruction” plan, at the international level, 
Indonesia has only recently and rather tacitly joined the coalition of Muslim countries 
combatting the IS. Aligned through the efforts of Saudi Arabia, 34 Muslim countries 
have vowed to unite and coordinate their efforts against the IS. In February 2016, 
Indonesia had agreed to join Malaysia and others by taking part in the advisory “Joint 
Coordinating Committee” within the coalition.470 If the full backing of Indonesia’s 
domestic civil societal and moderate Islamic organizations may be garnered, these efforts 
should be expanded to include increased material and physical resources along military 
and humanitarian assistance lines. This action could reinvigorate and potentially increase 
Indonesia’s eminence throughout the wider Muslim umma as a growing regional leader. 
3. A Step Beyond: The Rise of Communal Violence 
The horizontal threat to national unity through communal violence is appearing 
yet again within those regions that had experienced that violence in 1998–2003 such as 
Sulawesi, Kalimantan, Moluccas and West Java. Though on a smaller scale than the 
timeframe of 1998 to the mid 2000s, distinct to the present is the appearance of 
communal violence on the rise within regions that previously did not experience it before 
such as in Aceh, Sumatra, Central Java, and West Papua.471 Adding to this already 
unsettling notion is the corresponding and rising number of arrests of pro-IS supporters 
and affiliates by the POLRI within all of these regions of rising communal violence both 
old and new.472 
                                                 
469 Belford, “Indonesia Looks to Stop.” 
470 Ed Payne and Salam Abdelaziz, “Muslim Nations Form Coalition to Fight Terror, Call Islamic 
Extremism ‘Disease,’” CNN, December 22, 2015, http://www.cnn.com/2015/12/14/middleeast/islamic-
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A step beyond for potential future research poses the question of whether or not a 
correlation exists between the re-emergent rise of communal violence, the mobilization of 
radical jihadist groups, and transnational terrorist influences within specific regions of 
Indonesia? If so, what factors cause the perpetuation of the jihadist activism and focus on 
those regions and to what extent does this pose a threat to Indonesian unity, national 
security, and that of the Southeast region today? Should the Indonesian government fail 
to respond through the use of its criminal justice CT approach, the future for the state and 
its citizens may be as dark and as ominous as the ambitions of those under the black flag 
that seek to replace it. In 2013, an IPAC report forewarned, “It is the resilience of 
networks that keep coming back in new forms and may endure long enough to provide 
the seeds of a more dangerous movement if or when domestic or international 
circumstances change.”473 
                                                 
473 IPAC, Weak, Therefore Violent, 1. 
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APPENDIX.  “JI MAJOR LEADERS AND KEY FIGURES” 
Table 2.   “JI Major Leaders and Key Figures”474 
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